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Angels and Infidels: Hierarchy and
Historicism in Medieval Legal History
GUYORA BINDER*

I.

PROLOGUE: No SOCIAL CHANGE WITHOUT POLITICS

T

he basic argument of this Essay is that there is a fundamental
contradiction between two of our -most cherished values: the
idea that law should be a vehicle for social change and the idea
that law should be autonomous from politics.
The occasion for this argument is a recent, greatly ambitious,
and greatly acclaimed work of legal history that attempts to
demonstrate that the two values mentioned above are, after all,
reconcilable. Authored by Harold Berman, a recognized giant in
the field of comparative law, Law and Revolution: The Formation of
the Western Legal Tradition,' has received the Scribes book award
of the American Bar Association and has been praised in the Yale
Law Journal as "an impressive achievement, a towering contribution to comparative legal history, [that is] indispensable to anyone
who wishes to understand the distinctive features of Western civilization."' 2 The American PoliticalScience Review concluded that this
"magnificent volume ... may be the most important book on law
of our generation."
Harold Berman argues that our society's commitment to law's
*Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, J.D. Yale, 1980,
A.B. Princeton, 1977. I am indebted to Joe Bankman, Barry Boyer, Alan Freeman, Bob

Gordon, Tom Headrick, William Chester Jordan, Fred Konefsky, Betty Mensch, Bill
Miller, Schlegel, Rick Simins, Rob Steinfeld, and Michael Tigar, for comments and sugges-

tions. Thanks also to Andrea D'Alessio of WFMT Radio, Chicago.
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BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADI-

(1983).
2. Damaska, How Did it All Begin? (Book Review), 94 YALE LJ. 1807, 1824 (1985).
3. McDowell, Book Review, 78 AM. PoL ScL REv. 577 (1984). See also Roberts, Book
Review, 69 CoRNELL L. REV. 1119, 1125 (1984) ("a superb intellectual history"). Cf Landau, Book Review, 51 U. CHL L. REv. 937 (1984); Peters, The Origins of Western Legal Tradition (Book Review), 98 HARV. L. REv. 686-87 (1985) (valuable but flawed); Jordan, The Crisis
of the Western Legal Tradition (Book Review), 83 Micaj L. REv. 670 (1985); Tigar, Book
Review, 17 U. C. DAvis L. REv. 1035 (1984) (more flawed than valuable).
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autonomy and to law's efficacy for social change are persuasively
synthesized in the ideal of a legal science.4 His purpose seems to
be to save the traditional value of law's autonomy from politics,
which he perceives to be under attack from proponents of the
more modern idea that law should facilitate social change. Since
he identifies the autonomy of law from politics as the essence of
western civilization, his purpose is nothing less than the salvation
of that civilization. His strategy involves arguing that the idea of a
legal science, no less than the autonomy of law from politics, is an
enduring feature of western civilization. Accordingly, he asserts
that law has both served and been conceived ag a vehicle for social
change for a very long time. Specifically, he argues that, since the
eleventh century, (1) legal thought has been the moving force in
western history, and (2) legal scholars have sought social progress.
In this Essay, I demonstrate that both claims are incorrect.
First, I argue that medieval social change generated "scholastic"
legal thought rather than vice versa. Second, I show that "scholastic" legal thought was hostile to social change. Third, I suggest
that the reason Berman believes that medieval legal scholars applauded social change is that he systematically identifies hierarchical authority with social progress. Fourth, I assert that the reason
Berman believes that law's autonomy from politics is compatible
with its use as a vehicle for social change is that he identifies the
autonomy of law with hierarchical authority. Accordingly,
Berman is forced to attribute historical thinking to medieval scholastics by his own misguided effort to superimpose an image of
legal scholarship as social engineering over an image of it as a monastic retreat from society. At the same time, he is forced to deny
the ideological nature of his own account of medieval society by
his insistence that legal scholarship is apolitical. In a concluding
section, I demonstrate that Berman's belief that hierarchical authority is compatible with social progress is typical of modern legal scholars in the field of Berman's specialty, comparative law,
but that medieval legal scholars, while sharing Berman's enthusiasm for hierarchy, viewed it as incompatible with social change. I
suggest finally, that Berman's confusion on this point reflects the
influence of an early mentor who was more interested in a religious escape from history than in the inevitably political experi4.

H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 120-64.

ANGELS AND INFIDELS

1986]

529

ence of participating in history.
The notion that scholars should view themselves as participants in history may strike the reader as strange; yet one of the
premises that this Essay shares with Law and Revolution is that the
reconstruction of the legal past is an integral part of contemporary political struggle. Neither Harold Berman nor myself is a
professional historian. This Essay, like Berman's tome, is largely a
synthesis of good secondary sources available to the educated
layperson. Yet, I share with Harold Berman the conviction that
the reconstruction of law's role in history is too vitally important
to be confined to professional historians. Thus, my attack on the
accuracy of Berman's conclusions is in no way designed to demonstrate that legal scholars should steer clear of the business of interpreting the history of western civilization. It is merely designed to
demonstrate that the history of western civilization cannot be
marshalled to show that law can achieve social change without the
"taint" of politics. Rather, western history indicates that social
change is the product of violent political struggle in which legal
coercion and legal thought are both used as weapons.
II.

THE LAST DAYS OF LEGAL SCIENCE

"A screaming comes across the sky. It has happened before, but there is
nothing to compare it to now.
It is too late." 5
"Judgment Day is gettin' nearer
There it is in the rearview mirror
If you'd duck down I could see a little clearer
All over this world." 6
With the turn of the first millenium, the literate class of
Europeans became enamored of allegory. While the consolidation
of feudalism induced anxiety in a society suspicious of change, allegory enabled its scholars at once to chronicle events and to contain them. Wherever they looked-at the raising of a cathedral,
the suppression of a peasant revolt, the ordination of a cleric, or
the reclamation of the Promised Land-the same narrative was
5.
6.

T. PYNCHON, GRAVITY'S RAINBOW 3 (1974).
Goodman & Prine, The Twentieth Century is Almost Over, recorded on S. GOODMAN, SAY
IT IN PRIVATE. Courtesy and copyright 1977 Asylum Records. Published in the U.S.A. by
Asylum Records. All rights reserved.
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revealed: every defeat was a crucifixion, every victory was a resurrection, and all of history was a perpetual incarnation-a debasement of the sacred, but also a christening of the profane.
The agonistic relationship between heaven and earth provided medieval scholars with a model for explaining conflict wherever it manifested itself. The presence of evil in the world was
justified by the contrast it provided for virtue. The infinite grandeur of God was demonstrated by His capacity to love even those
who displeased Him, while the lesser virtue required to please
Him necessitated no such generosity. The erection of such a hierarchy made it possible to reconcile conflict and change with a
static and monistic model of the universe. The deployment of this
model for the purpose of transcending any contradiction is what
came to be known as the "scholastic" method. The application of
this method to the study of canon and Roman legal texts initiated
the profession of legal scholarship. This event, argues Harold
Berman in Law and Revolution,7 was the birth of western civilization. The turn of the second millenium, he laments, is witnessing
a disenchantment with scholasticism which threatens to bring that
civilization to an end.
The source of Berman's apocalyptic anxiety is his sense that
the essential feature of legal scholarship is a commitment to the
autonomy of law from politics.8 That commitment, he claims, is
now being eroded by the onslaught of third world infidels," and
undermined by the disaffection of heretics within the academy. 10
Yet, the decline of faith in the distinction between law and politics
is a logical consequence of the spread of the belief that law should
be a vehicle for social change. The notion that law is an empirical
science, commonly identified with the late nineteenth century, reflected an attempt to avert this consequence. Science, after all,
was supposed to be "objective"; yet, it was also expected to generate "progress." If contemporary legal scholars doubt the autonomy of law it is because the nineteenth century concept of a legal
science now seems outmoded. Berman attempts to defend the idea
of a legal science by presenting it as an enduring and essential
H. BERMAN, supra note 1.
8. Id. at 7, 8, 37, 38.
9. Id. at 33-34.
10. Id. at 40 (referring to Roberto Unger); id. at 590-91 (referring to Duncan
7.

Kennedy).
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feature of western civilization rather than as a naive expression of
nineteenth century positivism." Berman's defense has two elements: first, he argues that law and legal thought have been the
moving forces in the history of the West since the eleventh century. Second, he attributes this determinative role of law and legal
thought to the deliberate effort of legal scholars to achieve social
progress through the discovery of truth. These two claims merge
in his characterization of the development of scholastic legal
thought as a "revolution."
This Essay will demonstrate that neither of Berman's two
principal claims are convincing. An examination of social histories
of the middle ages shows that the social changes Berman attributes to scholastic legal thought preceded and probably shaped its
emergence. A review of intellectual histories of the period confirms that scholasticism was premised on an allegorical, rather
than an historical, sense of time. This meant that the scholastics
could scarcely acknowledge, let alone approve, fundamental social
change. Their image of transcendence was synchronic rather than
diachronic; they valorized hierarchy rather than progress. Allegory enabled medieval scholastics to reinterpret all change as a
manifestation of hierarchy.
In a mirror image of medieval allegory, Berman consistently
interprets images of hierarchy as expressions of faith in progress.
In endorsing Cromwell's remark that "[m]an never reaches so
high an estate as when he knows not whither he is going," 12
Berman reorients the figure from the vertical to the temporal dimension: "Society," claims Berman, "moves inevitably into the future. But it does so by walking backwards, so to speak, with its
eyes on the past." 1 The difficulty with Berman's interpretation is
that it equates ignorance of the future with knowledge of the past.
As the social historian Marc Bloch said of medieval chroniclers:
"[b]y a curious paradox, through the very fact of their respect for
the past, people come to reconstruct it as they considered it ought
to have been.' 4 In a later era, Harold Berman finds himself
careening down the road to apocalypse, anxiously eyeing the
rearview mirror for signs of the times. As a result, his image of
11. Id. at 8, 591 n.88.
12. Id. at 41.
13. Id.
14.

M.

BLOCH, FEUDAL

SOCIETY 92 (1961).
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the past is accurate as to detail, but arrayed exactly backwards.
III.

BERMAN'S NARRATIVE: SOCIAL HISTORY BY LEGISLATION

According to Berman, western civilization and modern times
both began abruptly in 1075 with what he calls the "Papal
Revolution." 15 Berman constructs this "revolution" out of three
distinct elements: the Cluniac reform, the Gregorian reform, and
the development of the scholastic method.
The Cluniac reform began around the turn of the millenium,
when a proliferating group of monasteries under the authority of
a single abbot became increasingly powerful in France. This order
attacked the local priesthood as "impure" and criticized the traditional practices of simony and clerical marriage." The Gregorian
reform began in 1075 when Pope Gregory VII claimed authority
over all other bishops and secular princes, including the Holy Roman Emperor. 17 This event touched off fifty years of civil war in
Germany, at the end of which the papacy had considerably more
influence over the selection of prelates, and more authority over
the church as a whole.1 8 One of the Gregorian goals realized in
this process was the institution of clerical celibacy.1 9 The scholastic method developed in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries
and provided for the systematic study of theology, canon law, and
Roman law. 20
How are these three events connected? Berman argues that
the Cluniac order was inspired by a millenarian vision of reform
which provided the European clergy with a translocal class consciousness.2

Pope Gregory, he continues, led this new class in a

revolutionary struggle to free itself from the domination of lay
persons. 2 The new scholastic theologians and lawyers developed
theories to justify the new unity and independence of the
church,23 integrated the new papal edicts into existing church
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 85-88.
Id. at 88-91.
Id. at 87, 96.
Id. at 96-99.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 89-90, 107-09.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 215-21.
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doctrine, 24 and staffed the Pope's new bureaucracy. Thus, concludes Berman, the scholastics attempted to realize the project of
reform initiated by the Cluniac order.2 5 Berman's conclusion that
the "papal revolution" initiated modern times rests on his claim
that it precipitated five additional events during the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries: (1) an increase in agricultural production;2 8
(2) the decline of serfdom;2 7 (3) the development of commerce;2 8
(4) the establishment of cities;2" and (5) the establishment of centralized monarchies. 30
In order to understand Berman's account of the rise of agricultural production and the amelioration of peasant circumstances, we must review Berman's description of the origins of the
manorial system of agriculture. According to Berman, the cause
of this harsh system was external to Western Europe. Invasive
raids by Arabs, Vikings, and Magyars terrorized the inhabitants of
Western Europe during the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries.3 1
In order to repulse these attacks it became necessary to mount a
heavy armed cavalry. Because military equipment was expensive
and agriculture was inefficient, the labor of dozens of people was
required to support each soldier.3 2 Accordingly, lords-the people owning most of the arable land-awarded land to their
soldiers.83
Peasants worked this land for the soldiers
"semivoluntarily""-presumably in return for protection. Serfdom and other forms of peasant subjugation, in other words, reflected a rational division of labor in the face of external threats.
This division of labor was subject to abuse by the soldiers only
because it was not legally regulated.3 5
The rise in agricultural production in eleventh and twelfth
century Europe is explained by Berman as the product of condi24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

202.
227.
101.
103.
102.

at
at
at
at
at
at

113-15.
301.
302.
302-03.
317.
318.
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tions of peace 8 and a new spirit of progress. Conditions of peace
were the byproducts of two factors-the successful resistance of
foreign invaders resulting from the erection of castles and the development of heavy cavalry; 37 and the administration of "peace
oaths" by propapal monks and clerics. 8 The spirit of progress,
Berman argues, was inherent in Christianity because it distinguished humanity from nature and urged human beings to master
nature.3 9 Propapal monks took the lead in expressing this spirit by
clearing land and spreading agriculture.4
This increase in agricultural production was only one of the
papal revolution's many contributions to the lot of peasants. Employment opportunities multiplied for peasants as a result of the
democratizing 1 influence of the papal revolution. The Pope
needed vast armies for his project of reforming the world: monks
to spread spiritual and agricultural enlightenment; crusaders to
liberate Byzantium and the Holy Land from the infidel. Peasants
could join religious orders or crusades. 2 Alternatively, they could
migrate to the newly chartered cities and participate in the revival
of commerce. 3 Yet, the peasants' new bargaining power might
have meant little without a new respect for bargains. Peasants
might have been unable to take advantage of their opportunities
had they not come to realize their own capacity for choice. An
image of social relations as the product of individual choice and
mutual agreement was developed by scholars of canon law 44 and
permeated society with the proliferation of professionally trained
lawyers. 5 Among the many new legal institutions that emerged in
this period were manorial courts, regulating relations between
lord and peasant. Here, the peasants learned that they were possessors of rights. 4' Because serfdom was inconsistent with this new
self-image, peasants realized, and persuaded their masters, that it
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

44.

Id. at 168-72, 183, 188, 192, 228.

45.
46.

Id. at 162, 328.
Id. at 323, 326-29.

319.
302.
90, 301.
62, 158.
101.
170.
320.
319.

1986]

535

ANGELS AND INFIDELS
4

was unjust.

7

The rise of commerce was a product of another "papal" idea:
the crusades. In their zeal to reform the world, Popes urged for
the liberation of the East from the infidel. This turned Europe
"outward" and made the Mediterranean into a "route for Europe's own military and commercial expansion.

' 48

This commer-

cial expansion was facilitated by the foundation of commercial
courts by merchants. Such legal sophistication among merchants
reflected the influence of the new professional lawyers, trained in
the techniques of scholasticism.49 In addition, the expansion of
commerce was facilitated by the development of cities.
The cities were founded as a result of papal influence as well;
they were established by collective oaths modeled on the "papalist" peace oaths. 50 These oaths were administered by propapal
clerics to merchants who thought their bishops too impure to rule
the new commercial centers. 51 These oaths developed into charters: elaborate written constitutions defining the structure of city
government.5 2 Again, such legal sophistication reflected the presence of scholastically trained lawyers. 58
Centralized monarchies were also a product of the papal
revolution. The hierarchical and bureaucratic structure developed
by the papacy in the twelfth century offered European monarchs a
model for the centralization of power." This model was consciously adopted by ambitious monarchs, who built their power by
issuing new legislation in imitation of the Pope.5 5 Pope Gregory
VII had justified his effort to supplant secular authorities in the
selection of new prelates by reminding the Emperor Henry IV
that "Christ said 'I am the truth.' He did not say 'I am the custom.'"56 Twelfth century monarchs showed a similar disregard
for custom; 57 however, they also accepted the Pope's demonstra47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

321, 331-32.
101.
344-46.
362.
90, 364, 387.
395-96.
363, 392, 401, 402.
405.
412, 415.
112.
513, 514, 518.
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tion that royal authority could be lawfully resisted."
IV.

ASSESSING BERMAN'S SOCIAL HISTORY

An examination of various social histo-ries of feudalism suggests that the social changes chronicled by Berman were not
caused by the Gregorian Reform, and that it is inappropriate to
characterize those changes as a papal revolution. I shall begin this
Section by summarizing an influential account of the origins of
manorial agriculture that differs markedly from Berman's. This
account suggests a quite different explanation for the rise of agricultural productivity, paints a different picture of peasant life
under feudalism, and provides a different chronicle of the origins
of commerce and urban communities. Finally, I shall assess
Berman's claims that the modern state was inspired by the Gregorian Reform. Ultimately, the Gregorian Reform shall appear as an
expression of the social changes of the eleventh century, rather
than their cause.
Berman's account of the rise of manorial agriculture presupposes the presence of powerful lords in firm possession of most of
the land in Western Europe. These lords offer employment to as-

piring knights, compensating them with land. These knights, in
turn, offer employment to frightened, landless peasants, compensating them with protection and a share of the harvest. Yet, such
leading social historians of the period as Perry Anderson, Marc
Bloch, and Georges Duby have noted that the manorial system
emerged in Germanic tribal societies with traditions of collective
ownership of land by "free" peasant communities.5 9 Originally,
the members of these communities shared military responsibilities
58. Id. at 504.
59. P. ANDERSON, PASSAGES FROM ANTIQUITY TO FEUDALISM 130-31 (1978); M. BLOCH,
supra note 14, at 243; G. DuBY. EARLY GROWTH OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY 33 (1974).
Berman apparently shares my respect for these historians; see infra note 381.
"Community" is a deliberately vague term, meant to embrace group households, kin
groups, blood brotherhoods, legislative judicial councils, and even strong friendships. William Miller indicates that each of these forms of association may have had a role in the
resolution of disputes in the relatively egalitarian society of medieval Iceland. Nor were
these different associations always entirely distinct-the boundaries of a kinship group
might be socially constructed in the context of a particular dispute. See Miller, Avoiding
Legal Judgment: The Submission of Disputes to Arbitration in Medieval Iceland, 28 AM. J. LEGAL
Htsr. 95 (1984) [hereinafter Miller, Arbitration in Medieval Iceland]; Miller, Choosing the
Avenger: Some Aspects of the Bloodfeud in Medieval Iceland and England, 1 LAw & HIST. REv.
159 (1983).
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as well. 60 These historians agree, however, that the emergence of
a distinct military class preceded its establishment on the land."
As Anderson tells the story, contact with the trading civilization
of the declining Roman Empire tended to generate mercenary
bands among the Germanic tribes. These bands provided the imperial marches with the ambiguous service of "protection." As
these tribes moved deeper into the Empire, the mercenary bands
became raiding armies, thriving on captured booty. 2 It was in this
manner, argues Georges Duby, that the Frankish Empire developed. The Empire was the product of rapid expansion, and the
authority of the emperor over his retinue was more the result of
his largesse in distributing the fruits of war-including
slaves-than of his control over land or peasantry.6 " While the
enormous estates characterizing the Roman Empire persisted in
Carolingian times, it appears that the proliferation of smaller estates that were to characterize later feudalism had not yet developed. It seems likely that most peasants farmed their own land,

individually or collectively.64 The inefficiency of Frankish agriculture prior to the eleventh century can be explained in part by the
rather limited demands made upon the land by the military class,
60. This remained true in Anglo-Saxon England. P.

BLAIR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AN260 (1966).
61. P. ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 140; M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 248; G. DuBY,
supra note 59, at 44.
62. P. ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 107-27.
GLO-SAXON ENGLAND

63. G.

DUBY, THE THREE ORDERS

150-52 (1980).

64.

P. ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 123, 141; M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 171, 243,
246; G. DUBY, supra note 59, at 33-34; Hilton, Introduction to P. SwEEzy, THE TRANSITION
FROM FEUDALISM TO CAPITALISM 14-15 (1978). Conditions were similar in pre-conquest England. M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 245, 420. We must resist the temptation to present an
overly rosy picture of early Germanic society, however. The presence of a substantial allodial peasantry should by no means be equated with an egalitarian society. Nobles existed in
Anglo-Saxon society and not all peasants were independent. See P. BLAIR, AN INTRODUCTION
TO ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND

260-63 (1966). M.M. Postan argues that by the time of the con-

quest Germanic society may have been almost as fully stratified as it was ever to be. M.M.
POSTAN, THE MEDIEVAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN IN THE

MIDDLE AGES 94 (1975). Icelandic society was less stratified, although it did contain leaders

or godis, servants and other disenfranchised free persons. Yet, there does appear to have
been a substantial stratum of enfranchised, economically independent "householders" or
boendr, farming individually or collectively. Even among these householders there were inequalities of power and wealth. The most grievous indictment of Icelandic society, and of
early Germanic societies in general, however, was the prevalence of slaves-who, incidentally, appear to have been the principal victims of bloodfeuds between householders. See
Miller, Arbitration in Medieval Iceland, supra note 59, at 97-99, 104, 115, 126.
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before the "invasions" lamented by Berman. 5
To characterize the military confrontations with the Vikings,
Magyars, and Arabs as "invasions of Europe" is to ignore the aggressive, expansionist nature of the Frankish Empire. For Duby,
the important consequence of these confrontations was that the
Frankish Empire ceased to expand. Viking raids-aimed primarily
at the acquisition of precious metals and slaves- appear to have
had less effect on agricultural production than scholars originally
believed. The chief threat to the peasants came not so much from
foreign invaders as from the local military class. Deprived of the
booty traditionally acquired by leading military raids, the Frankish
kings lost their hold over their own armed bands. Deprived of opportunities for looting abroad, the royal retinues made war on the
peasants.6 Thus, it was the peasants, rather than the kings, who
were compelled to offer the military class employment on their
land;6 7 and it was against the violence of that class, rather than
against any invaders, that the peasants chiefly sought
"protection."
This account of the origins of a dependent peasantry in Western Europe suggests an explanation of.the eleventh and twelfth
century increase in agricultural production very different from
that.advanced by Berman. The increase was the product, not of
the peaceful conditions that followed the Viking "invasions," but
of the violent conditions that followed the end of the Frankish
invasions. Peasants began to produce more because the new military class demanded more of them. While the cultivation of new
lands took place partly at the impetus of these new masters, it also
reflected the efforts of peasants bent on escaping domination.6 8
The peace associations mentioned by Berman represented another effort on the part of peasants to resist the depredations of
the military class. 69 These associations did not generate peace in
Europe; what eventually did was the military triumph of the
knightly class and the resumption of expansionist raiding, repre65. G. DUBY, supra note 59, at 87-93.
66. M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 245; G. DuBy, supra note 59, at 162-65; G. DuBY,
supra note 63, at 150-61.
67. M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 171, 243.
68. P. ANDERS N, supra note 59, at 188-89; G. DuBy, supra note 59, at 181, 200, 20203; Hilton, supra note 64, at 27.
69. G. DuBy, supra note 63, at 135-39, 186-89.
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sented by the crusades.70 Nevertheless, the peace movement, and
the many subsequent peasant movements it spawned, indicates
that peasants never fully accepted the legitimacy of knightly
claims to their land.
This reinterpretation casts the evolution of peasant circumstances over the next several centuries in a new light. The peasants did not, as Berman suggests, begin the new millenium in a
uniform state of subjection, nor did their lot improve in the wake
of the Gregorian reform. Manorial law did not elevate them from
a condition of subjection, but appears to have been a principal
means by which that subjection was enforced and legitimated. 7
While agricultural production expanded in the first third of the
new millenium, peasants by and large ate no better. Instead, the
excess was absorbed by a corresponding increase in population
and by the greater demands of the new ruling class. 7 2 The growth
of cities may have provided dispossessed peasants with new opportunities, but the projects of the church during this period by and
large did not. Those peasants that joined religious orders did not
thereby cease to be peasants; they tilled the monastic lands while
wellborn monks were educated for more prestigious tasks and
more comfortable circumstances. 7 The ruling orders envisioned
the Crusades primarily as a knightly enterprise; 4 while clerics encouraged the peasants to forswear arms.75 Those peasants that
heeded Peter the Hermit's call to liberate Jerusalem mostly
starved before they ever saw the Promised Land.78 If anything,
the social and cultural barriers between peasants, knights, and
clerics increased after the turn of the millenium 7
If there was little material improvement in peasant life after
the Gregorian Reform, neither was there any rise in social status.
While there was some commutation of compulsory labor services
70.

R. BROOKE & C. BROOKE, POPULAR RELIGION IN THE MIDDLE AGES: WESTERN EUROPE

1000-1300, at 57 (1984).
71. G. DUBY, supra note 59, at 171, 174, 178.
72. Id. at 183.
73. Id. at 220.
74. C. WOOD, THE QUEST FOR ETERNITY 96-102 (1983); N. COHN, THE PURSUIT OF THE
MILLENNIUM 61-68 (1970).
75. G. DUEY, supra note 59, at 162-63; G. DUBY, supra note 63, at 134-39; J. JOHNSON,
JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR 128-42 (1981).
76. N. COHN, supra note 74, at 89-90.

77. See generally G. DUBE,supra note 63 (analysis of the trifunctional model of feudal
society).
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to monetary payments, particularly in France, this was accompanied by the association of such payments with servitude, and by
the absorption of most free peasants into the servile class.7 German serfdom, developing somewhat later, seems to have depended more heavily on fees right from the outset.70 Here too,
the class of peasants considered unfree seems to have expanded
after the Gregorian Reform.80
What role did manorial law play in the commutation of compulsory service to rents and tolls? In the eleventh century, for a
variety of reasons, both secular and clerical landlords became desirous of money. Money enabled them to store and accumulate
the enormous surpluses they were extracting from the peasants."1
Contact with the Arab and Viking trading societies regenerated
some of Europe's dormant commerce and inspired the lords to
consume more extravagantly.8 2 The availability of money as a
pricing mechanism contributed to the efficiency of agriculture as
well, as some lords began to hire wage labor to till their own demesnes, paid for by rents collected on peasant lands.83 Where
lords were principally bent on acquiring funds, they found manorial justice a handy tool. The increasing importance of manorial, as opposed to royal, courts in determining the obligations
of French peasants in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, permit84
ted the progressive increase of "customary" rents and tolls.
Duby concludes that the fines generated by the exercise of manorial jurisdiction were probably more lucrative than either
ground rents or tolls for the use of mills and other manorial monopolies. "Of all seigneurial rights over people, justice was the
one that would most readily permit lords to relieve workers of the
money they had managed to earn."8 5
That manorial justice enabled lords to extract money from
the peasants, however, does not mean that it enabled peasants to
78. M.

BLOCH,

supra note 14, at 263, 323; Hilton, supra note 64, at 14-17.

79. G. DUBY, supra note 59, at 157 (German feudalism does not reach maturity until
end of twelfth century); M. BLOCH,supra note 14, at 244-45.
80. M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 267.

81.

Hilton, supra note 64, at 18.

82.
83.
84.

G. DuBY, supra note 59, at 120-54, 216, 232-35.
Id. at 226.
P. ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 187; M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 249; R. HILTON,

BOND MEN MADE FREE 68 (1973).

85.

G. DUBY, supra note 59, at 227-28.
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escape compulsory service. Where lords showed an interest in retaining or increasing compulsory service, they again found manorial law a useful tool. While it is generally acknowledged that
the English peasantry experienced a general decline in status
throughout the twelfth century,8" Rodney Hilton has argued that
there was no legal status of servitude recognized in England until
late in that century. At this point, shire courts suddenly began attributing villein status to peasants who had previously performed
customary services. The result was that the peasants could be
compelled to serve at the master's beck and call, and that their
personal mobility and the alienability of their tenure in land could
both be restricted.8 7 While individual peasants brought suit to
challenge their own villein status throughout the thirteenth century, they thereby accepted the courts' characterization of the
bulk of the once free English peasantry as villeins. "When the onslaught came, they accepted the lords' battleground. They did not
argue that the doing of labour services did not imply
unfreedom." 8 8
86. P. ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 161; M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 270. It should be
noted that I am by no means equating a decline in legal status with a decline in economic
fortune. M.M. Postan has speculated that English peasant fortunes may have actually improved in the mid-twelfth century because civil war conditions reduced the ability of landlords to enforce the peasant obligations increasingly specified by law. When conditions stabilized at the end of the century, however, Postan has acknowledged that the recently
systematized manorial law provided a ready tool for avaricious lords. M.M. POSTAN, supra
note 64, at 105-110, 166-69. One factor deemphasized in Postan's conclusion is the possibility that English peasants in the mid-twelfth century might have faced added exploitation
from other than their lords, for as he admits: "the worst effects of party war and of the
weakened government were to let loose upon the country a swarm of strong men capable
of preying on their neighbours." Id. at 107. The one conclusion that cannot be drawn
from this controversy is Berman's: that manorial law improved peasant status or wealth.

87. R.

HILTON,

Freedom and Villeinage in England, in

PEASANTS, KNIGHTS AND HERETICS

174-91 (1976). The shire courts were royal. See 1 F. PoLLocx & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 532-40 (1968). Nevertheless, the fact that
twelfth and thirteenth century peasants attempted to redress their grievances against their
lords in the royal courts evidences their dissatisfaction with manorial jurisdiction. Such dissatisfaction is not surprising-peasants could not sue their lords in manorial courts. Id. at
361. The shire courts employed the new status of villeinage to deny peasants standing on
the grounds that villeins were subject to manorial jurisdiction alone. By linking manorial
jurisdiction to villeinage, the shire courts actually weakened the peasants' position in the
manor-courts and justified the imposition of sterner obligations than custom had allowed.
This in turn increased the incentive for individual peasants to appeal to the royal courts for
release from manorial jurisdiction.
88. R. HILTON, supra note 87, at 189. Prior to the late twelfth century, the word villein was in use to describe peasants who were, to some extent, economically dependent on
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The distribution of royal jurisdiction to English landlords allowed them to further restrict peasant mobility. Originally
designed as a means of making freeholders responsible for one
another's appearance before the royal courts, the institution of
frankpledge evolved into a device by which lords could hold their
tenants responsible for one another's presence on the manor.8 9
When the bubonic plague dramatically reduced the agricultural
labor supply in the fourteenth century, Parliament sought to protect the profitability of estates by passing the Ordinance and the
Statute of Laborers that restricted the movement and froze the
wages of agricultural workers. "[T]hose very lords who were resisting, through the manor courts, their tenants' attempts at selfimprovement were, in their alternative roles as justices of laborers
and J.P.s, administering through the public courts the statutory
wage freeze of 1351."90 Legal repression of this sort inspired
peasant revolts throughout Europe in the fourteenth century;
only in their wake did peasant conditions improve to reflect the
decreasing labor supply.91 That English peasants despaired of succeeding by means of any legal strategy is indicated by the fact that
a major objective of their revolt was the destruction of manorial
2
records and the annihilation of all lawyers.
This is not to say that all European peasant movements eschewed legal struggle; but few peasants saw the courts administered by their lords, as vehicles by which they could achieve freedom. To the contrary, according to Bloch, vulnerability to
manorial jurisdiction was among the principal criteria available in
medieval culture for the identification of the unfree.9 3 If anything, it was the collective effort to escape manorial jurisdiction
their landlords. Yet, it never denoted the kind of thoroughgoing constraint that it came to
represent in the thirteenth century. Postan speculates that some villeins may have been
descended from freed slaves, but slaves appear to have been concentrated in those portions
of Anglo-Saxon England that were heavily settled by the Romans. See M.M. POSTAN, supra
note 64, at 92-93; H. HALLAM, RURAL ENGLAND 1066-1348, at 24 (1981). Those areas of
England devoted to allodial agriculture in Roman times experienced a steady decline in the
independence of their peasantry both before and after the conquest. P. BLAIR, AN INTRODUCTION TO ANGLO-SAxoN ENGLAND 261-328 (1966); H. HALLAM, supra, at 23 (postconquest); M.M. PosTA, supra note 64, at 92-96 (preconquest).
89.

M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 271.

90.
91.
92.
93.

R. HILTON, supra note 84, at 152.
P. ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 201-04.
R. HILTON, supra note 84, at 226-27.
M. BLOcH, supra note 14, at 272-73. See supra note 87.
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altogether that constituted the medieval peasant's most successful
legal strategy. Rodney Hilton has shown that most peasant struggles for "freedom" in twelfth and thirteenth century France and
Italy involved efforts to gain recognition for entire villages as politically autonomous communes. 4 One of the forms of collective
self-government most frequently demanded by such communities
was the right to administer their own courts.95 Were these democratic impulses inspired, as Berman suggests, by peasant participation in the manorial courts? Hilton offers an alternative explanation: "There seems little doubt that control of village commons
provided an important early focus for the development of self-administrations in northern Italy." 9 6 Duby suggests that parish
churches, which before the Gregorian Reform were considered
the common property of their members 9 7 also provided a focus
for organization. Berman offers no reason to conclude that peasants needed to learn from their masters that they were oppressed.
The marked increase in commerce that took place during the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries may well have increased economic opportunities for peasants during this period, although it
was probably made possible by the lords' accumulation of wealth
at the expense of the peasants. 99 Much of this wealth was accumulated by monasteries. 10 0 Nevertheless, to attribute this boom to

the Gregorian Reform is perverse. In the first place, monasteries
acquired much of their wealth through the largesse of the military
class.101 Second, the ethics preached by the church were fundamentally hostile to commerce.102 Berman grudgingly admits that
94. R. HILTON, supra note 84, at 74-75.
95. Id. at 77, 78, 83.
96. Id. at 76.
97. M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 351, 251-52. See also R.BROOKE & C. BROOKE, supra
note 70, at 82.
98. G. DuBY, supra note 59, at 94. Some of the spirit of pre-Gregorian parish churches
may have been captured by the Synod of Rome's complaint in 826 that "many people,
mostly women, come to Church on Sundays and holy days not to attend the Mass but to
dance, sing broad songs and do other such pagan things." J. RuSSELL, WrrcHcRAFr IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 75 (1984).

99. G. DUBY, supra note 59, at 181.
100. Id. at 213-21.
101. Id. at 167; K SOUTHERN,WESTERN SOCIETY AND THE CHURCH IN THE MIDDLE AGES
228-29 (1970). Also, there is some evidence of increasingly efficient exploitation of tenants
by monasteries in thirteenth century England. See Miller, The English Economy in the Thirteenth Century: Implications of Recent Research, 28 PAST & PREsENT 21(1964).
102. M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 353.
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canon law forbade profit-making for the purpose of accumulating
private capital.103 In fact, the growth of monastic orders appears
1 04
to have been fueled by revulsion at the spread of commerce.
Third, the expansion of commerce began prior to the Gregorian
reform, in response to the "invasions. 1 0 5 Duby reports that trading cities in Italy and Spain had begun to engage in periodic raiding campaigns against Muslim settlements long before the Pope
called for the defense of Byzantium.106 Pilgrims, too, had con10 7
ducted trade in the Eastern Mediterranean for some time.
Berman's remaining ground for attributing the increase in commerce to the Gregorian reform, that commerce was facilitated by
the rise of independent cities, rests on his claim that this development too, was papally inspired.
This last claim rests in turn on two related assertions: that the
eleventh century phenomenon of peace associations was papally
inspired and that urban communes were an outgrowth of this
movement. Berman traces the origin of the peace movement to
the drafting of a "Truce of God" by the Abbot of Cluny toward
the middle of the eleventh century.108 He dates the urban movement from the investiture struggle late in the eleventh century. In
fact, both movements had earlier and deeper roots.
The band of free peasants, holding land in common, was a
form of social organization traditional among Germanic tribes.10 '
Membership in such a clan or group entitled one to the protection
of its law or "peace. 110 Such associations functioned as courts and
persisted in Germany as forums for dispute resolution well into
the feudal era. 11 Participation in these tribunals, which often entailed collective oathtaking,112 was an important criterion of free103. Id. at 248.
104. G. DuBY, supra note 59, at 179.
105. Id. at 120-54.
106. Id. at 139-48. In early medieval societies, trading and raiding were often functionally similar acts. See Miller, Gift, Sale, Payment, Raid: Case Studies in the Negotiation and
Classification of Exchange in Medieval Iceland, 61-I SPECULUM 18 (1986).
107. G. DUBY, supra note 59, at 150-51, 159-60.
108. Id. at 90.

109. P. ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 108, 130-31, 174. See generally Miller, supra note
64.
110.
111.

G. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 200 (1961).
M. BLocn, supra note 14, at 268.

112. Id. at 124.
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dom.11s Sometimes, such communities were established or reaffirmed by collective oaths.'" In England, "peace guilds"
flourished before the Norman Conquest and provided the basis
for the later Norman institution of frankpledge.11 5 "Peace," in
this context, hardly implied pacifism: members of one English
guild swore perpetual unity "for friendship as well as for vengeance." ' In Carolingian France, such groups formed to actively
resist the manorialization of the countryside, sometimes burning
castles.117 In the eighth century, Charlemagne, identifying such
associations as pagan, prohibited "guilds." 1 " A century later,
when many bound peasants were escaping to the woods to join
free bands, his successors prohibited "conjurations" or conspiracies.1 19 During this period, Bishop Hincmar of Rheims vigorously
condemned peasant drinking associations.12 0 Monks, too, lamented the formation of peasant associations. 2 1 Even in the eleventh century, when bishops began to administer peace oaths, they
continued to condemn associations that formed without clerical
participation. According to Duby, many such associations were
largely indifferent to the Cluniac project of reforming the clergy:
Heresy-radical, disruptive, appearing shortly after the year 1000 as one
sign, perhaps the most convincing sign, of that tumultuous vitality that impelled Western civilization forward in its sudden advance-did not consist in
criticism of priests, or denunciations of their impurity. It lay rather in the
1 22
wish to forego their services, in the desire to deny the clergy's usefulness.
113. Id. at 255, 257, 272-74; G. DuBY, supra note 59, at 33.
114. M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 355; G. DuBY, supra note 63, at 28, 135.
115. M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 419-20.
116. M. TIGAR & M. LEVY, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPrTLtSM 88 (1975). For a discussion of Icelandic Blood-Brotherhood and Bloodfeud, see Miller, supra note 59.
117. G. DuBY, supra note 59, at 94; G. DuBY, supra note 63, at 187.
118. G. DUBY, supra note 63, at 28; M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 416.
119. G. DuBY, supra note 59, at 94-95.
120. Id. at 137.
121. G. DuBY, supra note 63, at 186-89.
122. Id. at 31. According to Jeffrey Russell, eleventh century heretics "preached that
the kingdom of God was in the hearts of the saved and that there was no need for priests
or the church." J. RUSSELL, WrrCHCRAFT IN THE MIDDLE AGrS 64 (1984). Such heresies,
according to Edward Peters, offered "new kinds of association, new bonds of the spirit." E.
PETERs, HERESY AND AuTHORrY IN MEDIEVAL EuRoPE DocUmENTS IN TRANSLATION 63
(1980). Heretical groups of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were also condemned for
dispensing with priests, both for preaching and for the sacraments. See infra notes 201,
210, & 214 (Waldensians, Henry of Le Mans, Heretics in Rhineland, Amalricians, Brethren
of the Free Spirit). That the touchstone of heresy was unauthorized association is revealed
by the fate of the Beguines. Groups of pious women, joining in religious communities to
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The urban movements were heretical in this sense: "[T]heir
form of organization," wrote Michael Tigar and Madeleine Levy,
"challenged the rule of the Church as the only institution authorized to mediate between the Trinity and the mass of individual
sinners on earth. 1 2 Thus, the communes were outgrowths of
peace associations, but not of any propapal "Peace of God" movement. It was the knights who ultimately embraced the "Peace of
God"; by defining the peasants and the clergy as "noncombatants," the "Peace of God" movement gave the knights a monopoly on legitimate force."' The "Peace of God" was a means of
channeling unrest, not an inspiration for it.125 Late in the twelfth
century, when new peace associations appeared without clerical
sponsorship, they were condemned as heretical and brutally suppressed.1 26 In the thirteenth century, urban associations that
formed without royal approval were condemned by the French ju1 27
rist Beaumanoir
It is against this continuing background of social struggle that
the emergence of urban communes must be understood. The cities were focal points for heresy in the eleventh century,1 28 but
they were also centers of peasant population. They were largely
populated by artisans and laborers of peasant origin, and even
work and live, they were attacked as heretical despite the fact that their beliefs were entirely orthodox. The accusation was based on the fact that they had not received papal
authorization, they followed no rule, and were not administered by ordained priests or
monks. "Since these women promise no obedience to anyone and do not renounce their
property or profess an approved Rule, they are certainly not 'religious,'" concluded the
Council of Vienne in 1312. By 1274, such associations had already been condemned by the
Council of Lyons and over the course of the fourteenth century Beguine communities were
dissolved and forced into approved orders. E. PrERs, supra, at 236; R. SOUTHERN, supra
note 101, at 329-31.
123. M. TIGAR & M. LEVY, supra note 116, at 88-89. See also infra note 325 and accompanying text.
124. J. JOHNSON, supra note 75, at 128-48.
125. G. DUBY, supra note 63, at 161.
126. M. BLOcH, supra note 14, at 416-17; G. DuaY, supra note 63, at 330-33.
127. M. TIGAR & M. LEVY, supra note 116, at 132, 139-41.
128. G. DuBY,supra note 63, at 131, 216. Cities and towns remained centers of heresy
after the eleventh century as well. They flourished in the Italian City-States where the
enforcement of orthodoxy was weak. R. BROOKE & C. BROOKE, supra note 70, at 102. Cities
provided the crucible for many popular religious movements in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. R. SOUTrHERN, supra note 101, at 303-09; see generally N. COHN, supra note
74. Many of the Cathars worked as weavers in the Flemish towns, R. BROOKE & C BROOKE,
supra note 70, at 100, as did the Waldensians. E. PETERS, supra note 122, at 153. The
Beguines too, were an urban phenomenon. Id. at 236.
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farmers. 12 9 The urban movement can thus be understood as part
of a wider movement for peasant enfranchisement. The chartering of cities, spreading at the end of the eleventh century, was
contemporaneous with the chartering of peasant villages and
towns. 1 0 Moreover, urban collectivism did not begin in the eleventh century; some charters appeared earlier. In any case, the
chartering of a commune indicated only its recognition by a lord.
Because Berman is anxious to present the Gregorian Reform as
the inspiration for urban collectivism, he only discusses urban uprisings transpiring after the Reform was under way; but urban collectivism actually anticipated the Gregorian Reform.
Berman's explanation of the rise of urban communes is illustrated by his account of the emergence of such a commune in
Cambrai. While this is only one of many such stories in Berman's
narrative, it is the first and serves as a paradigm:"1
In 1075, shortly after Pope Gregory VII had declared the political and legal
unity of the church and its independence from the empire, the population of
Cambrai, led by a papalist priest and wealthy merchants, rose up against the
authority of the emperor and his bishop and 'swore a commune.' This revolt
was quickly put down. However, two years later, when a new bishop left the
diocese to receive imperial investiture, a second revolt succeeded. Under the
leadership, once again, of a Gregorian priest and the wealthiest merchants,
the citizens swore oaths of fidelity to the commune and pledged themselves
to defend it against a restoration of episcopal authority. In 1106, however,
the emperor intervened to repress the commune once again. Only after the
end of the Investiture Struggle (1122) did Cambrai receive a modern charter of liberties, the oldest extant copy of which is dated 1184.11,

While Berman does not say so explicitly, his reader is certainly left
with the impression that the 1075 insurrection against the bishop
was the first of many in Cambrai, and was a response to the Pope's
actions. In fact, the citizens of Cambrai joined in an oath against
their bishop as early as 958. s s In the 1020s Bishop Gerard of
Cambrai was plagued by heretical conjurations in his see, which
he apparently identified with the contemporary peace movement,
129. M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 277; G. DUBY, supra note 59, at 57; M. TAR & M.
supra note 116, at 80-83.
130. R. HILTON, supra note 84, at 74-85.
131. "Other episcopal towns of Picardy ... followed the example of Cambrai." H.
BERMAN, supra note 1, at 366.
132. Id. at 364.
133. G. DuBY, supra note 59, at 136; M. TIGAR & M. LEVY, supra note 116, at 95.
LEVY,
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as well earlier pagan associations.134 Another anti-episcopal insurrection appeared at Liege in the tenth century." 5 As early as 967,
some French cities were even receiving charters.136 Elsewhere,
particularly in England, Northern Germany, and the Pyrenees,
relatively independent urban settlements seem to have emerged in
1 37
the tenth century without much fuss.
Later movements were not necessarily inspired by, or even
aligned with, the papacy and the monasteries. Perhaps the one
clear instance of the papacy intervening on behalf of an urban
communal movement was in Milan in 1077. Yet even here, it intervened reluctantly in support of a movement that had already
struggled for decades.13 8 While the Milanese movement in particular was anti-episcopal, what seemed to unite the urban movements was their antipathy to all clergy, rather than their preference for some clergy over others. For example, early in the
twelfth century the townspeople of V~zelay, lacking a bishop, rose
against their abbot.139 And what are we to make of the irrepressible Arnold of Brescia? Originally an abbot, he is described by
Otto of Freising as a heretic. In 1135 he began to preach priestly
poverty and lay communion and participated in a revolt against
the bishop of Brescia. Having excited the hostility of a Pope, a
king, and the leader of the Cistercian Order, he traveled eventually to Rome, where he led a communal movement in revolt
14 0
against a Pope, only to be executed by an Emperor.
Berman's picture of the papacy as a prototype of the modern
state is suggestive, but his claim that the papacy provided
monarchs with a model is not convincingly supported. His chief
example of papal influence is the Norman Kingdom of Sicily,
which developed a highly centralized administrative structure.
Berman notes that Pope Gregory succeeded in forming an alliance
with his powerful neighbor, but is compelled to acknowledge that
its terms were dictated by the Norman rulers, who rejected the
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
387.
139.
140.

G. DUBY, supra note 63, at 28-37.
G. DUBY, supra note 59, at 136.
M. TIGAR & M. LEVY, supra note 116, at 88.
G. DuBY, supra note 59, at 131, 134, 142-43.
R. BROOKE & C.BROOKE, supra note 70, at 534-35. Cf H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at
P, BROOKE & C. BROOKE, supra note 70, at 93.
E. PErERs, supra note 122, at 78-80.
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Pope's claim to authority over the entire church.141 Similarly, he
admits that when the Normans arrived in Southern Italy early in
the eleventh century they found sophisticated Arab and Byzantine
administrative institutions in place. They appropriated many of
these institutions, but continued to staff them with Arabs and
Greeks. 42 In light of this concession, Berman's unsupported claim
that the structure of the Norman state was "probably" influenced
by that of the papacy has a decidedly speculative ring. The Arab
and Byzantine Empires developed bureaucracies before the papacy did. Both of these empires were present in Italy in the tenth
and eleventh centuries; perhaps they inspired the administrative
design of the papacy as well as that of the Kingdom of Sicily.1 48
Berman's claim that the investiture struggle introduced the
theme of constitutional limitations on royal power into European
politics is a part of his larger account of the progressive influence
of the reformed church. Berman's notion that Pope Gregory's dispute with the Emperor persuaded the European nobility of their
right to resist the will of their monarchs dovetails with Berman's
notion that peasant unrest was, albeit indirectly, inspired by scholastic legal thought.
There are two difficulties with Berman's explanation for the
restiveness of the nobility. First, the investiture struggle took
place towards the end of a sustained decentralization of power in
Western Europe. French and German monarchs had lost their
hold over the military class. In challenging royal power, therefore,
the Pope was joining the victorious side in a dispute already well
under way.1 44 Second, the nobility had no need to appeal to divine
law to justify restraining royal power because they could invoke
customary law. Customary law was understood to be the product
of collective experience rather than that of a king's will. The king
was viewed as guardian and exponent of his people's customs and
141.

H.

142.

Id. at 414-15; see also P. ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 167.

BERMAN,

supra note 1, at 409-11.

143. Berman concludes that "[T]here seem to have been virtually no direct contemporary... Islamic influences on the development of Western legal systems in their formative era," while acknowledging "Arab influence ...on certain specific governmental institutions and practices." H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 160-61. Since Berman seems to view
bureaucratic organization and bureaucratic rationality as defining characteristics of western
legal systems, this distinction between "legal systems" and "governmental institutions" is
puzzling.
144. G. DuBy, supra note 63, at 149-61.
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his accession, even if hereditary, was often understood to be authorized by popular consent. 145 Thus, nobility and peasantry alike
were amply provided with anti-authoritarian ideology before the
Gregorian Reform.
In fact, if Pope Gregory can be said to have introduced a new
theme into medieval political thought, it would be the theme of
unlimited authority. Berman describes the investiture struggle as a
dispute between church and state; but it can also be seen as a
struggle between Pope and parish. Rosalind and Christopher
Brooke note that "the process of forming new parishes . . .became fossilized in the 12th century... because of a strengthening
of episcopal authority which made the informal establishment of
parishes impossible, and of the Church's courts and common law,
which provided a legal framework much more difficult to
break."1 46 Prior to the investiture struggle priests had been seen
as employees of their parishes. Even bishops were ostensibly
elected, rather than selected.1 4 7 The role of monarchs and lesser
lords in the appointment of priests was derivative from the authority of their subjects. They purported to act as representatives
or agents of disenfranchised villages.1 48 By assuming ultimate authority over the appointment of all priests, the Pope challenged
the assumption that the church was even nominally responsible to
its members,149 and, incidentally, legitimized their disenfranchisement by the lords.
Neither the papacy nor the monasteries created feudal society, but they did attempt to take advantage of it. The last two
centuries had seen the rise to power of an undisciplined military
class in France and Germany, at the expense of royal institutions
and peasant communities. Late in the eleventh century, this class
had already triumphed in France and was feeling its strength in
Germany. Pope Gregory chose this moment to challenge the emperor, precipitating:
145. G. SAriNE,supra note 110, at 200-08.
146. k BROOKE & C. BROOKE, supra note 70, at 82.
147.

M. BLOcH, supra note 14, at 351.

148. Id. at 251-52.
149. Brooke & Brooke recount the tale of a twelfth century parish priest who was
condemned as a heretic for urging his parishioners to minister to the poor among them
rather than paying for sacraments or going on pilgrimages. K, BROOKE & C. BROOKE,supra

note 70, at 125.
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generalized civil war in Germany, as the local nobility seized the opportunity
to rise against the Emperor, with Papal blessing. During fifty years of constant strife, a great social change now occurred in Germany: in the conditions of ruthless depredations, anarchy and social violence, the German aristocracy destroyed the allodial basis of the non-noble free population that
had always predominated in Saxony and Thuringia and been a pervasive
presence in Bavaria and Swabia . . . .The peasantry was reduced to
serfdom. 5 0

The reform of the church was part of the general decline of
royal authority and peasant autonomy that characterized what
Duby has called "the feudal revolution. ' 15 1 One of the royal institutions weakened during this period was episcopal authority. One
of the communal institutions weakened during this period was the
parish church. The Pope and the monks gained ascendancy within
152
the church by affixing themselves to the victorious knights.
They did not initiate the military expansion of Western Europe
toward the Eastern Mediterranean, but they glorified it. They did
not initiate the peace movement, but they channeled it away from
resistance and toward acquiescence. The twelfth century witnessed the remarkable phenomenon of the knights engrossed in
foreign military adventures without losing their hold over the
peasants. If the Gregorian Reform helped produce any important
social change during the eleventh century, it was that:
The merits attaching to willing acceptance of the laborer's lot were held up
for popular admiration. In the world of the dead the people were promised
redemption, which indulgence would soon be promised to the crusades. An
attempt was made to convince them that there was in fact a mutual exchange of services, that they were themselves served, that the 'great,' the
'nobles' sacrificed themselves for the populace, in virtue of which their privileges were rendered legitimate. 153
V.

BERMAN'S EXPLANATION: THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

If I have correctly estimated the church's role in the social
changes of the eleventh century, then it was more a beneficiary
than a cause. The chief agent of change in this period was the
newly unfettered military class; of secondary, but still substantial
150.
151.
152.
153.

P. ANDERaSON, supra note 59, at 163-64.
G. DuBY, supra note 63, at 147.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 161.
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importance, was the peasant class-resourceful in resisting the establishment of feudalism. If the church made a causal contribution to the establishment of feudalism, it was ideological: the reformed church justified feudalism by discouraging peasant
resistance.
Berman agrees that the chief causal contribution of the
church to social change in this period was ideological. He disagrees, however, as to the nature of the social change, the importance of ideology in producing it, and the content of that ideology. For Berman, the eleventh and twelfth centuries witnessed,
not the establishment of feudalism, but its decline. This decline,
he argues, was attributable to the ideological content of the legal
culture nurtured by the church. 1 " According to Berman, that culture was informed by a commitment to an idea of progress developed by scholastic theologians. Thus influenced, he suggests, early
legal scholars saw law as a device for continuously reforming society in order to bring about its gradual improvement.
The notion that medieval scholastics believed in the possibility of human progress will probably strike readers as strange. We
tend to associate faith in human history as a vehicle for the improvement of society with the nineteenth century. Historians of
the idea of progress have traditionally assumed that Western Europe was an extremely inhospitable environment for the incubation of that idea before the advent of humanist historiography in
the sixteenth century.255 The chief barriers to the idea's implantation, moreover, are generally thought to have been religious and
legal traditions. For the church, belief in the realizability of the
good by human agency is thought to have been precluded by the
idea of original sin. Intertwined with this idea, in the highly influential thought of Augustine, was a classically inspired contempt
for the temporal. The church fathers followed Plato and the stoics
in attributing value to the eternal only; from this standpoint,
H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 321, 328, 330-32.
J. BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 58 (1955); J. PoCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUION
AND THE FEUDAL LAW 18 (1967) (Roman law first invoked as evidence that the source of law
is legislative rather than customary, in sixteenth century France); id. at 30-35 (sovereign
legislator inconceivable in English legal culture before influence of French historiography
in seventeenth century); id. at 248 (historicism a product of the eighteenth century with
154.
155.

seventeenth century roots). On humanist legal history see J. FRANKLIN,

JEAN BODIN AND THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY REVOLUTION IN THE METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND HISTORY (1963).
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change was understood as "corruption." 15 The hostility to
change implicit in this attitude was reinforced by legal traditions
brought to Western Europe by the Germanic tribes before their
conversion to Christianity. According to these traditions, law was
157
identified with custom persisting "from time immemorial.
From this perspective, change was per se illegitimate.
Berman nevertheless insists that worldly change was valued
and sought by scholastic theologians and legal scholars. He derives
this conclusion principally from the stress laid upon the idea and
imagery of the incarnation within the reformed church. Beginning in the late eleventh century, he argues, the church saw its
role as the progressive realization of divine virtue within human
society.15 According to Berman, the eleventh century monks that
initiated the papal revolution, were inspired by an apocalyptic
faith that the millenium was at hand. Human history, they are
supposed to have felt, would soon involve a victorious struggle
against the forces of the antichrist, leading to a better world.15 9
This spirit was articulated by twelfth century intellectuals, especially Joachim of Fiore.16 0 It was institutionalized in a papal bureaucracy, the innovative spirit of which is revealed by the fact
that it issued legislation.1 61 The proliferation of legislation re162
flected a new belief in the worldly efficacy of individual will.
Berman finds evidence of this individual voluntarism in a diversity of surprising locations. The reformed church, he argues,
valued intellectual freedom, encouraging empirical science and
doctrinal debate.16 s Its law of marriage"" and wills" 5 implied that
individual decision makers could control the future. Its inquiry
into the mental state of accused criminals-especially heretics-implied that individuals were responsible for their own
sin.166 Conversely, its new concept of purgatory implied that indi156. J. BURY, supra note 155, at 11-28.
157. M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 111-13; j. PococK, supra note 155, at 30-55; G. SABINE, supra note 110, at 200-08.
158. H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 103, 158, 178-79.
159. Id. at 109-12.
160. Id. at 112, 128.
161. Id. at 11, 202.
162. Id. at 95.
163. Id. at 156, 159.
164. Id. at 228.
165. Id. at 236-37.
166. Id. at 182-85 (penance implies individual responsibility for sins); id. at 189-92
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viduals were 167
responsible for their own salvation and could achieve
it over time.
Berman believes that the church as a whole strove similarly to
improve itself over time. He finds potent evidence of this in the
fact that the church and other political institutions were often described by medieval scholars as "bodies. 1 26 8 To Berman, this

means that such institutions were characterized by "organic
' The means by which such "organic growth" was realgrowth."169
ized included not only legislation, but legal scholarship.170 The
typical activity of the medieval scholar, Berman argues, involved
the attempt to reconcile an apparent contradiction, generally by
moving to a higher level of abstraction.1 7 1 This, Berman con-

cludes, entailed the achievement of progress, not only on paper,
but in the world.17 Berman's overall claim is that medieval legal

scholars were motivated by the belief that as "bodies" of law
"grew," divinity would be progressively embodied in human
life. 178 I will argue that this image of the incarnation is an anach-

ronism-a modernist collage of ideas torn from their original context in the tapestry of medieval thought. The effect, like Marcel
Duchamp's "Nude Descending Staircase" is to impart the illusion
of motion to a static image. To the medieval eye, the nude had
always been, belonged, and would irredeemably remain, at the
bottom of the staircase. Berman consistently reinterprets this faith
in hierarchy as a sense of history.
VI.

ASSESSING BERMAN'S INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

Berman's claim that the scholastics believed that good was
capable of being cumulatively achieved in the world by human
agency, rests upon his assertion of the importance of millenarian
prophecy in medieval thought. One should be hesitant in attributing millenarian enthusiasm to the scholastics, however. While
(role of intent in canon theory of crimes); id. at 188, 252 (importance of intent as element
of heresy).
167. Id. at 169-72, 197.
168. Id. at 9, 216-17, 286.
169. Id. at 9, 119, 202-03.
170. Id. at 254.
171. Id. at 157, 164.
172. Id. at 158, 197.
173. Id. at 178-79.
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many of medieval Europe's millenarian movements seem to have
been aimed at transforming the social world, these movements
were generally external to and often opposed to the established
church. 7 4 According to Duby, "[t]he indictment of papal tyranny,
expressed in the dream of a Holy Spirit which would invade the
world and render the priesthood meaningless, lay at the heart of
the prophecies of Joachim of Fiore.

' 176

Accordingly, the writings

of Joachim-a Cistercian abbot-were condemned by the main
center of scholastic thought, the University of Paris.1 76 While
many eleventh century monks showed an interest in apocalyptic
prophecy, they generally took the imminence of judgment as a
mandate to withdraw from the social world rather than attempt to
reform it. 17 7 They saw history as determined, and saw human at-

tempts to interfere with the divine plan as dangerous sources of
disorder.1 78 Nor is it appropriate to identify scholastic thought
with monastic millenarianism. The militant monks of the eleventh
and twelfth centuries tended to be anti-intellectual and opposed
the systematic theology being developed in the cathedral schools
(hence "scholastic") under the jurisdiction of their traditional enemies, the bishops.179 The success of scholasticism reflected a resurgence of episcopal power within the church at the expense of the
monasteries.180
The day of judgment had significance in scholastic as well as
monastic thought, but it implied nothing like the modern idea of
progress. It was not a goal to be realized in human history or by
human agency; rather, it was to be the product of divine intervention. It was something "to be suffered, not achieved."181 For Augustine, judgment day need not have been heralded by any whole174. See also infra notes 175, 201. See generally N. COHN, supra note 74.
175. G. DUBY, THE AGE OF THE CATHEDRAL 168 (E. Levieux & B. Thompson trans.
1981). See also the discussion of Joachim of Fiore and his influence on the heretical
Amalricians and "Brethren of the Free Spirit," in J. RUSSELL, supra note 122, at 138-41.
For an introduction to Joachim's thought, see writings collected and edited in B. McGINN,
APOCALYPTIC SPIRITUALITY 97-148 (1979).
176. E. PETERS, supra note 122, at 218.
177. G. DuBY, supra note 175, at 58; G. DuBY, supra note 63, at 140-44.
178. G. DUBY, supra note 63, at 189-90.
179. G. Duay, supra note 175, at 65-70 (Cluniac Order); id. at 119-21 (Cistercian Order); E. PETERS, supra note 122, at 87-90 (Cistercian Order); cf. J. LECLERCQ, LOVE OF
LEARNING AND THE DESIRE FOR GOD (1961).
180. G. DuBY, supra note 175, at 139; G. DuBY, supra note 63, at 206.
181. M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 84.
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sale change in society; redemption would be offered only to the
few.182 When later thinkers expected judgment to be preceded by
dramatic events, they nevertheless saw those events as the unfolding of a preexisting divine plan.""3 Aquinas, the great scholastic, might grudgingly acknowledge that the world could be improved, but only by divine creation, not by human adaptation:
[T]he universe cannot be better than it is, because of the supremely befitting
order which God has assigned to things, wherein the good of the universe
consists. If any one of these things were [separately] better, the proportion
which constitutes the order of the whole would be vitiated .... Neverthe-

less, God could make other things than he has, or could add others to the
things he has made; and this other universe would be better. 84

Because judgment was divine, the scholastics did not really think
of it as a future historical event. Instead, they thought of it as
already present in the mind of God. Dante defined eternity as
"the point at which all times are present"1 85 and the scholastics
viewed historical events as expressions of an unchanging divine
plan. To the discerning eye, therefore, judgment, no less than creation, was implicit in every human experience. From the age of
Augustine to that of Aquinas, commented Georges Duby:
[T]ime had offered [theologians] a homogeneous whole in which by divine
example past and future were inseparable from the present and entertained
mystic relations with it. The creation and the end of the world merged, in
relation to eternity, mingling with actual experience. This conception of duration had been expressed by Saint Augustine and Dionysus the Aeropagite.
On it rested Suger's concordances, the biblical examples of Peter le
Mangeur, and the entire symbolical structure in which cathedral art reduced
time to the cosmic whirling of rose windows. Past events did not explain the
present, they prefigured it while completing it.186

The apocalyptic anxiety that gripped Western Europe in the
eleventh century failed to inspire the established church with a
sense of history because it could be so easily absorbed into existing
allegorical images. 87 These allegories depicted events as static hi182. J. BURY, supra note 155, at 21.
183.

R. COLUNGwooD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 53-55 (1946); M. BLOcH, supra note 14, at

83-84 (discussing the millenarian Bishop Otto of Friesing).
184. A. LovEjoY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING 79 (1961) (quoting Aquinas).
185. Dante, Paradiso, XVII, 18, quoted in E. KANrrOROWicz, THE KING'S Two BODIES
279 (1957).
186. G. DuBY, supra note 175, at 171.
187. This was true for the dissident monks as well. See G. DUBY, supra note 63, at 193.
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erarchies rather than dynamic processes. Duby quotes Dionysus,
an early writer he believes influenced Abbot Suger, the originator
of Gothic architecture. According to Dionysus, God stirs "the passive part of our soul, which lifts itself toward the most divine realities by correctly combining allegorical symbols in figurative representations."188 "[God] institutes us in hierarchy so that we may
participate in the liturgy of their heavenly hierarchies through the
resemblance." 1 9 The incarnation, which came to dominate ecclesiastical thought even more than the last judgment in the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries, was such an allegorical figure-a framework for interpreting, not changing, every life and death. 190
Berman treats the great moments of Christian eschatology as
social changes to be achieved over time, rather than as enduring
aspects of an ordered universe. As a consequence, he assumes that
the scholastics viewed human will as an agent of social change.
Thus, he lays great stress on the fact that Pope Gregory VII
claimed the power to "'create new laws in accordance with the
needs of the times.' "191 Berman identifies the power to legislate
in response to social change with a power to legislate in order to
bring about or facilitate social change. To the scholastics, however, legislation in no way implied social innovation. They had inherited the classical view of legislation as a device for fixing social
institutions. The Greeks favored legislation because they believed
that a single discerning lawmaker was best able to frame institutions worthy of enduring. Any deviation from such institutions
they viewed as "corruption. 11 92 Since the scholastics, too, saw virtue in enduring order, they also saw social change as corruption.
When scholastically trained lawyers attacked any particular cus93
tom, they generally argued that it was not authentically old.
New legislation might be necessary to correct, but never to generate, social change. According to Duby, the notion of law inherited
by the scholastics from Augustine and Dionysus the Aeropagite
entailed the maintenance of hierarchy for "'the aim of hierarchy
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 56.
Id.
G. DuaY, supra note 175, at 164-65, 156.
H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 202 (quoting Pope Gregory VII).
J. BURY, supra note 155, at 11.
M. BLOCH, supra note 14, at 113.
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",194

If-and here lay the evil, the worm in the fruit, the rot-this movement
should fall into disorder, men, obedient to God's intentions, should then
work with all their hearts to restore calm and regularity to the cycle. The
Dionysian notion of hierarchy thus required continual reformation of that

which was constantly undergoing deformation. 195

There was a kind of perpetual motion implicit in the allegorical vision of the scholastics, but it was not progress in the world.
Instead, it was a semiotic movement between the visible world and
the heaven of divine meaning. The redemption of the world's inhabitants, however, required law to keep them in their place.
According to Alan [of Lille], just as everything in the human body.., has
imposed upon it by an exchange of services-as in a seigniory or state-an

order, so the eternal goal ... can be achieved only if, in the visible world,
every man accepts his assigned condition and remains where God has placed

him-unmoving, awaiting resurrection.'"

Thus, it is incorrect to assume that an increase in legislative
activity implied any increased respect for individual human will.
The function of legislation was to replicate and preserve a divine
order, rather than to realize the discretion of the legislator. It was
corrective rather than creative.
A similar attitude pervaded the scholastic conception of natural science. The very few scholastics that took an interest in natural science apparently viewed it as a contemplative activity. They
catalogued creation as a means of understanding the creator,
rather than imitating him. Scientific knowledge was not valued as
a means of changing or manipulating the natural world, but of
detaching oneself from it. 19 7 For the scholastics, understanding

the world was a very different thing from living in it.198 Perhaps
for this reason, familiarity with the natural world was not an important part of the scholastic project. Instead, natural science
flourished in medieval Arab society and in those areas of Italy
most influenced by Arab culture.919
194. G. DuBY, supra note 63, at 113 (quoting Dionysus).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 317.
197. J. BuRy, supra note 155, at 14 (description of Roman stoic attitude toward science). Id. at 27-28 (ascription of this attitude to the medieval scientist Roger Bacon).
198. See infra text accompanying note 247.
199. G. DuBY, supra note 175, at 180.
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Berman's case for the intellectual independence of the scholastics therefore appears overdrawn. Certainly scholastic thought
was riven with conflict, but that hardly implies that it welcomed
diversity of opinion. The church of the high middle ages required
simultaneous belief in the transcendence and the immanence of
God. However, works that asserted the latter position too vigorously were liable to be condemned; 00 and, the advocacy of either

position to the exclusion of the other was an index of heresy. 201
Scholasticism was encouraged and supported by secular and eccle-

siastical powers in the thirteenth century as an antidote to these
heresies. Its chief function was to clarify, to defend, and, above
all, to fix Catholic dogma. 0 2 This made possible the development

of a pervasive church bureaucracy for the policing and surveillance of heresy that assumed its most notorious form in the
200. Id. at 173; A. LovEjoy, supra note 184, at 72-73 (Abelard condemned for urging
the necessity of the created world); E. PwrERs, supra note 122, at 218, 227; id. at 120-21
(millenarian prophecies of Joachim of Fiore and Averroist doctrine of the eternity of the
temporal world condemned); see id. at 87.
201. The leading heresies condemned by the church held diametrically opposed positions. I have alluded to eleventh century heresies that viewed priests as unnecessary, a position that Duby identifies with the view that "every man was a member of God and therefore untainted with sin." G. DuBY, supra note 175, at 136. In the twelfth century, the
Vaudois or Waldensians of Lyons were condemned for worshiping without priests. Id. at
132. The Waldensians viewed the priests as supernumerary exploiters, Passau Anonymous,
On the Origins of Heresy and the Sect of the Waldensians, in E. PETERS, HERESY AND AUTHORITY
IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 154 (1980), while favoring a universal priesthood of believers and the
lay right to preach. Id. at 141. Perhaps incorrectly, they were accused of gluttony and
excess. J. RUSSELL, supra note 122, at 126. Although hardly libertines, they apparently approved of clerical marriage. E. Prrms, supra, at 160. The Amalricians of the early thirteenth century similarly extended a pantheistic belief in God's immanence to the point of
declaring themselves God, and, combining this with the Millenarian prophecies of Joachim
of Fiore, concluded that the established church was no longer necessary. J. RUSSELL, supra
note 122, at 138-39. These ideas, condemned in 1210, see E. PETERS, supra, at 218, were
taken up later in the thirteenth century by the "Brethren of the Free Spirit" that permeated Italy, Germany, and the low countries. According to the Jeffrey Russell, materialism,
pantheism, and the priesthood of believers were frequently related themes in the heresies
of this period. See J. RUSSELL, supra note 122, at 140-41; G. DUBY, supra note 175, at 12.
The Albigensians or Cathars, by contrast, refused to believe that God had become man
and condemned the priesthood as necessarily profane, because of their profound disgust
for everything created. See J. RUSSELL, supra note 122, at 134. See generally readings on
Cathars, E. PErERs, supra, at 103-37; J. RUSSELL, supra note 122, at 121-23. Similar criticisms of the excessive worldliness of the church were reported among heretics in the
Rhineland, Everinus of Steinfeld, Letter to St. Bernard 1143 in E. PrERS, supra, at 92, and
attributed to the "heretical" Arnold of Brescia, Otto of Freising, Arnold of Brescia in Rome
1148-55 in E. PErERS, supra, at 79, in the mid-twelfth century.
202. G. DUBY, supra note 175, at 96, 137-38.
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Inquisition. 20 3

The Inquisition's inquiry into the beliefs of accused heretics
did not reflect any particular appreciation for individuality. As
Berman stresses, inquisitorial judges sought to elicit knowledge
about their witnesses that the witnesses did not themselves
have-for knowledge of the soul was only possible through the
accumulated wisdom of the church. 0 4 Since it was the church,
rather than the individual, that was supposed to have privileged
access to such knowledge, there is no reason to think that there
was anything "private" or "individual" about the object of such
knowledge. Moreover, it should not be assumed that heresy was
chiefly a crime of belief. Recall that heresy was not only a form of
group worship, but a form of political organization. Its chief identifying feature was the effort to dispense with the clergy as a device for unifying the group. Thus, heresy was chiefly a crime of
association. The significance of articulating deviant beliefs was
partly evidentiary; it was an index of membership, or of not having been properly instructed by the true church. The inquisitors,
however, were generally less interested in the witnesses' beliefs
than in their associates. 0 5 It should be recalled that most of those
interrogated by the Inquisition had already been named by
others, 206 and that an important means of eliciting confessions
203. Id. at 144. For the origins of the Inquisition see J. RUSSELL, supra note 201, at
153-55.
204. H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 184.
205. Consider these instructions in the Manualfor Inquisitors at Carcasonne, 1248-49:
After taking an oath to abjure heresy and to harbor no heretics, the person is
diligently questioned about whether he saw a heretic or Waldensian, where and
when, how often and with whom, and about others who were present; whether
he listened to their preaching or exhortation and whether he gave them lodging or arranged shelter for them; whether he conducted them from place to
place or otherwise consorted with them or arranged for them to be guided or
escorted; whether he ate or drank with them or ate bread blessed by them;
whether he gave or sent anything to them; whether he acted as their financial
agent or messenger or assistant; whether he held any deposit or anything else of
theirs; whether he received the Peace from their book, mouth, shoulder, or
elbow; whether he adored a heretic or bowed his head or genuflected and said
"Bless us" before heretics or . . . whether he was otherwise on familiar terms
with or associated with heretics or Waldenses in any way . ...
Almost as an afterthought is added "whether he believed in the heretics or Waldenses or
their errors." A Manualfor Inquisitors at Carcasonne, quoted in E. PETERs, supra note 122, at
201-02. See also id. at 211.
206. G. DUBY, supra note 175, at 144; J. RussELL, supra note 122, at 153.
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from those so named was physical torture."" The Inquisition, in

short, physically punished guilt by association.
If the church's regulation of belief showed little respect for

individual will, neither did its law of marriages or wills. In the eyes
of the church, these activities were less expressions of personal

discretion than of religious obligation. From this perspective, consent was neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for mar-

riage. On the one hand, it is difficult to characterize marriage as
voluntary when communities of pious women, such as the Beguines, could be condemned for rejecting it.2

s

On the other

hand, one can hardly conclude that canon law founded marriage
on consent when it refused to recognize wedding vows unless ad-

ministered by a priest. While such unauthorized weddings were
customary in many parts of Europe, 20 9 they came to be viewed as
symptoms of heresy. 10
Like the common laws of marriage, the laws of wills reflected
the expansion of clerical authority, rather than individual liberty.
While canon law recognized bequests that secular law often did
not, Berman acknowledges that a principal beneficiary of these bequests was the church itself. As part of their role as administrators
of penance and extreme unction, priests would encourage their
parishioners to improve their eternal odds by making a final gift.
Legation was virtually, like marriage, a sacrament.2 11
The sacraments conferred membership in the church, but not
necessarily as an expression of the consent of the members. Indeed, some members were condemned as heretical for failure to
grasp this point. In the twelfth century, many Christians challenged the necessity of baptism on the grounds that infants were
incapable of consenting to membership in the church. The theologians responded that the church consented for the infants; they
207. H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 252.
208.
These views were first forcibly expressed by . . . Bruno, bishop of Olmuetz,
writing to the pope in 1273. He complained that

. . .

the women used their

liberty as a veil of wickedness, in order to escape the yoke of obedience to their
priests and 'the coercion of marital bonds.' Bruno had a single remedy: 'I would
have them married or thrust into an approved Order.'
R. SOUTHERN, supra note 101, at 329.
209. R. BROOKE & C. BROOKE, supra note 70, at 113.
210. E. PETERS, supra note 122, at 77.
211. Id. at 231.
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were baptized in the faith of the church. 1 2 Gratian, the great
codifier of canon law, held that consent was irrelevant to the effectiveness of a sacrament, while form was essential. 213 Thus, if
consent was unnecessary for participation in a sacrament, neither
was it sufficient. Communion and penance, like baptism and marriage, came to be placed in the hands of the priest rather than the
hearts of the worshipers. Groups that felt that priests were unnecessary for the performance of these sacraments were condemned
as heretics during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.21 4 Yet,
these groups had simply attempted to preserve the experiences of
communion and confession-still available within the church during the eleventh century-as relationships among worshipers. By
the end of the twelfth century those sacraments had become primarily priestly rites.215
The idea of purgatory should also be viewed in light of this
new conception of the sacraments. Purgatory was where most
Catholics expected to perform the penances assigned by their
priests. Thus, it did not denote that individuals were responsible
for their own salvation-indulgence for time in purgatory was
subject to the jurisdiction of the church. The imagining of a time
and space intermediate between heaven and earth reflected the
new conception of the church as a necessary mediation between
God and humanity, rather than a human community itself. Purgatory reflected not so much the replacement of the community
with the individual as moral agent, as the substitution of one conception of association for another. Because it made salvation
unintelligible to the uneducated, the new doctrine met with resistance among the common folk.21 Because it enhanced the power
of the priesthood, the doctrine of purgatory was consistently rejected by heretical movements, beginning with those condemned
212.

S. CHODOROW, CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THEORY AND CHURCH POLITICS IN THE MID-

81-85 (1972). See also E. PETERS, supra note 122, at 158 (Waldensians);
id. at 93 (German Heretics); id. at 74, 79.
213. S. CHODOROW, supra note 212, at 87.

TWELFTH CENTURY

214. E. PrRas, supra note 122, at 159; id. at 202 (Waldensians view priests as unnecessary for penance and communion); id. at 92 (German heretics taking communion without
priests).

215. P, BROOKE & C. BROOKE, supra note 70, at 115 (communion); id. at 118
(confession).
216. J. LE GOFF, THE BIRTH OF PURGATORY 217-18 (1984).
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by Gerard of Cambrai early in the eleventh century.'"
In sum, the scholastics did not value the individual will as a
force capable of improving the world. It is a major distortion to
present the scholastics as social reformers bent on realizing progress in the world. To the contrary, they were focused on preserving and defending an order which they regarded as fixed. They
could hardly regard temporal history as a means of realizing the
good, for they clung to a contempt for the world as the locus of
sin. Movements that sought to bring about redemption on earth,
they regarded as heretical. At the same time, they were committed to the legitimacy of contemporary authority, for it was "ordained of God. '2 18 Therefore, progress was doubly precluded:
first because the world was inherently bad; second because the
world was good beyond improvement.2 19
Whatever instability might be found in scholastic thought is
the product of this contradiction between God's transcendence of,
and immanence in, the world. But it is a mistake to think that only
the idea of progress could reconcile this contradiction. As Arthur
Lovejoy and Georges Duby have each demonstrated, the medieval
church found the idea of order, or hierarchy, a sufficient response
to this problem. It was only by virtue of God's generosity that imperfect creatures were allowed to exist. Tolerance of inferior
creatures by superior ones, in turn, mirrored divine virtue-but
such tolerance in no way implied equality. To the contrary, the
early church fathers had written, "if all things were equal, all
things would not be. '2 20 The church saw sin as the source of the
world's baseness. Yet that sin, originating in Adam's desire, was
identified with Adam's punishment-servitude. Superimposed
upon the feudal distinction between free warrior and servile peasant, the church erected a new distinction between the free celibate and the slave of sin. 221 Either criterion of freedom justified a
kind of stewardship of the unfree.
David Brion Davis has shown that the tension between God's
217. Id. at 168-73, 268-70. E. PrrsaS, supra note 122, at 78 (Henry of LeMans in
1135-1136); id. at 94 (Heretics in Rhineland in 1143); id. at 155, 160-61, 163
(Waldensians).
218. T. AQuINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (question 93 article 3).
219. A. LovEjoY, supra note 184, at 70-71.
220. Id. at 67. See id. at 60-66 (on classical origins of this idea). See also G. DuBY, supra
note 63, at 70-71.
221. G. DUBY, supra note 63, at 7-8.
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immanence and the doctrine of original sin enabled scholastic
thought to simultaneously lament and justify slavery.22 The
church in particular, by mediating between God and the mass of
sinning humanity, brought sinners into a (distant) relationship
with God, and made God immanent in their world. The church
represented its members to God and represented God to its members. Why could not all human beings be as free of sin as the
clergy? The answer was that the clergy could not be perfect, but
only relatively good. It was only in the clergy's superiority to and
benevolence toward the laity that their resemblance to God consisted. Without evil creatures, wrote Aquinas, "all possible grades
of goodness would not be filled up, nor would any creature be like
God in having pre-eminence over another. ' ' 223 Indeed, the Crea-

tor's own perfection might be suspect in a world without hierarchy: "Thus the supreme beauty would be lost to the creation if
there were lacking that order by which things are dissimilar and
unequal . . . a dead level of equality in things . . . would be a

manifest derogation from the perfection of creation. 224 Only hierarchy made possible the analogical chain linking the base to the
divine-hierarchy was the sinner's ladder to heaven.
It should be obvious that this ladder was not one that the sinner could ascend in person, or of his own volition. Redemption
was conveyed from God by way of the clergy to the sinner; the
sinner could not reach heaven by assuming the lifestyle of the
clergy-that way lay heresy. The "great chain of being" described
by Lovejoy was not, therefore, a pathway along which individuals
or even society could move. Rather, it was a static structure existing until the end of time. What scholasticism made possible was
the apprehension and description of that structure. One scholastic
approach to the problem of transcendence and immanence held
that the world was base-incoherent, multiple, particular, ephemeral-only as perceived by human beings; as perceived by the
mind of God, however, the world was an enduring unity. 225 An
important respect in which the clergy resembled-even represented-God, was in their relatively superior understanding.
222. D.
223.

DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 94-96
A. LovEjoY, supra note 184, at 76 (quoting Aquinas).

(1966).

224. Id. at 77.
225. T. AQUINAS, supra note 218 (question 93, articles 1 and 2; question 94, article 2).
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"God's will," insisted Aquinas, "is intelligence itself."22 In order
to grasp the unity of the world, argued Aquinas, it was necessary
to employ ideas. These were concepts exemplified by entities in
the world, but-like God himself-transcending them.227 The
church itself was such a concept, including but transcending its
members.
It must be stressed that the ideas that occupied scholastic
thought were not utterly divorced from the world. They were a
means of understanding the world, but not a means of understanding the world as a process of change. To the contrary, for
scholastics to understand a worldly phenomenon meant to grasp
that which was unchanging about it. Ernst Kantorowicz has indicated that this project necessitated the development of a new conception of time-sempiternity-that was intermediate between
the eternal and the temporal.228 If divine law was eternal and
human law was temporal, natural law was sempiternal. While the
individual human body was ephemeral, embodiment itself-the
nature of the species-was enduring. It was the sempiternal aspect
of the world-its enduring or regular features-that indicated
that it was a divine creation. If sempiternity did not redeem the
world, it revealed the world's capacity, its potential worthiness, for
redemption.
How did the scholastics discover the sempiternal realm? From
the perspective of hindsight the task seems easy. All the scholastics had to do was read Aristotle. Certainly classical essentialism
provided the inspiration for the abstractions that haunted scholastic thought. Nevertheless, the integration of classical philosophy
into catholic dogma was no mean feat. To the cautious Catholic,
Aristotelian essences could (and did) appear to be pagan idolatries,
rivals of God. 229 How could the Catholic believe in the reality of
transcendent abstractions and yet avoid pantheism? The ingenious
solution hit upon by the scholastics was to imagine ideas as divine
creations analogous to the only incorporeal creatures in whom belief was justified by biblical authority: angels.230 The sempiternal
226.
227.
228.
229.
209, 218
230.

Id. (question 93, article 4).
Id. (question 93, article 2; question 94, article 2).
E. KANrroRowcz, supra note 185, at 275-80.
See E. PErs, supra note 122, at 227-30 (especially propositions 3, 66, 72, 80,
regarding the condemnation of pantheistic implications of Aristotelian thought).
E. KAnrroRowlcz, supra note 185, at 280-82.
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realm was occupied by angels. These were the creatures that administered purgatory, identifying those souls capable of redemption and administering their penance.3 1
Of course, the representatives of these angels on earth were
the clergy. Like the angels, the clergy could hasten redemption by
imposing penances for sins committed. Their roles were not temporally circumscribed-they could, properly persuaded by the living, intercede on behalf of souls already departed;21

2

alternatively,

if sufficiently impressed by a donor's pious generosity, they could
redeem sins as yet uncommitted.8 3
While the legal system administered by the clergy focused unprecedented attention on time, it did so for the ultimate purpose
of upsetting its sequence and erasing its effects.23 ' Rosalind and
Christopher Brooke acknowledge that the remission of penalties
by indulgence was expressed in terms of time. Nevertheless, they
warn us against the misapprehension that indulgence or purgation
were temporal processes: "Days and years of purgatory . . .were

never intended to be taken literally but only to indicate the scale
of the benefit; but . . . they soon deceived some of the faith-

ful-and even more profoundly many modern students-into
thinking that purgatory could be measured in time.

'2 5

Indeed,

the very vastness of the periods of purgation available for
purchase indicates their distance from individual, or even collective, historical experience. Thus, canon law sought to transcend
the temporality of individuals by joining them in a sempiternal
church.
Much of Berman's argument that the church of the high middle ages was bent on worldly progress rests upon the increasing
231. J. LE GOFF, supra note 216, at 211.
232. Id. at 211.
233. SEE R. BROOKE& C. BROOKE, supra note 70, at 127 (popular belief that rich man's

soul could "pass through the eye of the needle" if he gave enough to the church). The
practice of granting prospective indulgences began with the plenary indulgence offered (in
advance) to all who died in the Crusades. Id. at 59. By the beginning of the fourteenth
century wealthy individuals could purchase such plenary indulgences, to be granted at
death by a confessor, from the Pope. Eventually, individuals could purchase such plenary

indulgences from lesser figures; they could purchase prospective indulgences in the event
of sudden, unconfessed death; or, they could even purchase plenary indulgence of past sins
automatically renewable by every future confession. See R. SOUTHERN, supra note 101, at
137, 139, 140. See also B. TUCHMANN,A DIsTANT MIRROR 26, 28, 121 (1978).
234. See J. LE GoFF, supra note 216, at 209.
235. R. BROOKE & C. BROOKE, supra note 70, at 153.
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emphasis placed on the idea of incarnation. The clergy, argues
Berman, was bent upon realizing the incarnation of God on earth.
This way of writing reflects an anachronistic understanding of the
concept of incarnation. Scholastics did not imagine that the
church would erect the heavenly city on earth, in time. They continued to believe, as Augustine had instructed, that the heavenly
city existed already and eternally. They did not see the church as
a vehicle for bringing about the incarnation in the future-rather, they saw the church from its inception as the incarnation. That they saw the church as God's incarnation does not,
however, mean that they now saw the church as more worldly
than before. The church had been identified with Christ's body
since the time of Paul.2 86 What made the identification of the
church with God increasingly acceptable was a change in the conception of the church that made it less carnal, less human. When
Carolingian prelates described the church as Christ's body, they
meant that Christ's body was present in the physical bodies of
church members. The church was the community of Christians.
This "real body" of Christ was merely symbolized by the "mystical body" of the host, taken in the ritual of communion.2 3 7 When,
by contrast, scholastics described the church as God's incarnation,
they meant that the church represented or personated God on
earth; it was the "mystical body" of Christ. The "real body" of
Christ was now the host. 8 Membership in the church was now
constituted, rather than merely symbolized, by the receipt of communion from an ordained priest. 89 Thus, the church that "incarnated" God was distinct from its members. It was not a group of
particular people existing at a particular time, but an artificial person existing for all time. 40 In short, it was not a body, but a corporation. 24 1 In characterizing the church as a corporation, the

scholastics treated it as a creature, but nevertheless distanced it
from the world it governed. The church corporate was not
236.
237.
238.
239.
at 37-38.

E. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 185, at 195.
Id. at 195-96.
Id. at 196.
See S. CHODOROW, supra note 212, at 81-94. See also R. SOUTHERN, supra note 101,
Christopher and Rosalind Brooke describe the declining involvement of lay peo-

ple in the rite of communion during the twelfth century. C. BROOKE & R. BROOKE, supra

note 70, at 115.
240.

E. KAroRowICz, supra note 185, at 206, 209.

241. Id. at 202-03.
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human. It did not grow, develop, decay, or die. It was an enduring order, a sempiternal abstraction: an angel.24 2
Even as the clerical hierarchy began to conceive of the church
as an angel, some worshipers struggled to preserve the older
meaning of the church as the flesh and blood of Christ. In a letter
to St. Bernard in 1143, Everinus of Steinfeld described as heretics
those who
daily at their tables ... according to the form of Christ and his apostles, do
consecrate their meat and drink into the body and blood of Christ, by the
Lord's prayer, to nourish themselves therewith, as being the members and
body of Christ .... But as for us, they
say we hold not the truth of the
24 3
sacraments, but only a kind of shadow.

For these heterodox Christians, the truth of the sacrament remained that they themselves became "the body and members of
Christ." Assumption of the dead's identity through contact with
their body or blood was perfectly possible within the magical
worldview of the early middle ages; 244 nor was the fusion of a
group into a single body beyond imagining. However, the Aristotelian conception of causation, increasingly embraced by the hierarchy, rendered such events as strange to them as they are to
us. 245 Compared to the visceral communion of the heretics, the
hierarchy's church was indeed a shadow-or, more precisely, an
angel.
This sheds light on the one clich6 about scholasticism that all
modern schoolchildren must know and none must understand. To
express the incomprehensibility of the medieval mind to the modern, it is sufficient to recall that its exponents argued about how
many angels could dance on the head of a pin. When, however,
one adds that the church was a corporation, and the corporation
an angel, the practical importance of the question may be
appreciated.
Aquinas indicates the significance of the problem in the
course of his discussion of law. Much of this discussion is aimed at
demonstrating that law may be simultaneously conceived as a
unity and a multiplicity. Eternal law, Aquinas concludes, is a single
principle in the mind of God, though perceived by man as a multi242. Id. at 282-83.
243.

E. PETmS, supra note 114, at 92.

244. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 59, at 175-94.
245. J. RussELL, supra note 122, at 193.
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plicity of particular applications."" Natural law, similarly, is derived from the single principle of reason. This principle is innate
in human beings; nevertheless, they may not be aware of it, even
when performing particular actions. There is a difference between
exemplifying and understanding a concept:
[A] truth is self-evident at two stages, one, in itself, two in our minds. A
proposition is self-evident in itself when the predicate is of the essence of the
subject. At the same time the proposition may not be self-evident to a man
who does not know the definition of the subject. For instance, 'man is a rational animal,' is a self-evident proposition of its nature, since to say 'man' is
to say 'rational.' Yet to someone who does not grasp what man really is, the
24 7
proposition is not self-evident.

If God is more capable of understanding the unity of law than
man, then understanding law as a unity makes one closer to God.
According to Berman, this was the sort of understanding of law
which scholastic legal scholars sought to cultivate.2 48 According to
Aquinas, such understanding requires an awareness of concepts.
Yet, the next example offered by Aquinas reveals that to understand a concept one must realize that it does not merely unify
the particulars that exemplify it, but that it also transcends them.
Aquinas continues:
Sometimes... propositions are self-evident only to the well-informed, who
know what the terms of the proposition mean. Thus to one who appreciates
that an angel is not a bodily substance it is self-evident that an angel is not
circumscribed in place. This, however, is not manifest to those who are unin24
structed and do not grasp what is meant.

How many angels can dance on the head of a pin? If this strikes us
as an idle question, it is only because we are-as were most members of medieval society-uninstructed. A scholastic would realize
that, having no bodies, an infinite number of angels could occupy
a space at the same time; but would wonder whether, without
bodies, angels could dance at all. Not to see that these two answers-infinity or zero-were the only possibilities, implied a failure to grasp that sempiternal concepts transcended any particular
space and time.
From the perspective of the clergy, whether sempiternal be246.
247.
248.
249.

T. AquINAs, supra note 218 (question 93, articles 1 and 2).
Id. (question 94, article 2).
H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 163-64.
T. AQuiNAs, supra note 218 (question 94, article 2).
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ings were transcendent or immanent was not merely a question of
philosophical interest. Given their assertion that the church was
such a being, the capacity of such beings to transcend space and
time was a question of the utmost political importance. Someone
who thought that angels could be "circumscribed as to place"
might think the same of a corporation. Such a person might think
of a church as a group of parishioners living together in a particular village. She might mistake the decisions of those parishioners
for the decisions of their church. To the contrary, argued Alvarus
Pelagius, "[t]he mystical body of Christ is where the head is, that
is, the Pope."25 In the political context of the times, the church's
ubiquity implied its hierarchical governance. "[T]he notion corpus
mysticum. . which formerly served to exalt the Church united in
the Sacrament, began to be used in the hierarchical Church as a
25 1
means to exalt the emperor-like pope," concludes Kantorowicz.
To misconceive the nature of angels was to challenge the authority of the clerical hierarchy. If angels could walk upon the earth,
the church was as temporal as its members-and that, pace Professor Berman, was the one thing scholastic thought could not think.
Berman denies that the scholastic conception of the ecclesiastical corporation was excessively hierarchical. He particularly objects to the critique of scholasticism offered by the leading exponent of German historical jurisprudence, Otto Gierke. Gierke
distinguished between two conceptions of the group: an association formed and governed by its members, and an institution established and governed by a higher authority, for its members'
benefit. Gierke identified the former conception with "Germanic"
society, and the latter conception with Roman Law. In Gierke's
view, the church, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
increasingly favored the "Roman" conception. 252 Berman characterizes Gierke's views as "overdrawn, '253 or "thoroughly disproved," while adding that "Gierke's thesis is weakened by the
fact that the medieval canonists themselves were apparently not
250.
251.

E. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 185, at 204 (quoting Alvarus Pelagius).
Id. at 203.

252. H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 220, 607. See generally A. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES
OF THE MIDDL.E AGES (1900) (discussing the medieval theories of the state and the
corporation).
253. H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 220.
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aware of either of the two concepts."' 25 By contrast, he argues

that under canon law, corporations could be formed without approval from a higher authority and often could not act without
the consent of their members.255
These claims do not bear close scrutiny. What Berman characterizes as "overdrawn" are Gierke's beliefs "that corporate personality in a legal sense can ever emerge solely from within a
group" and that corporate personality could be imposed by a
higher authority "without the prior existence of a group. "256 This
is in the nature of a confession and an avoidance: it is an effort to
justify hierarchy within the church, rather than deny its presence.
What Berman characterizes as "thoroughly disproved" is
Gierke's claim that Pope Innocent IV viewed corporate personality as the artificial creation of a higher authority. He directs us to
works by Brian Tierney and Pierre Gillet-yet, Tierney says little
more than that Gillet systematically misunderstood Gierke.257
Tierney agrees with Berman that canon lawyers did not concern
themselves with the question of whether the church was an association or an institution-but only because they all agreed that the
church was an institution. 258 However, the assertion that they
were ignorant of any alternative conception of the group cannot
be sustained. Spontaneous associations had been part of the fabric
of European social and religious life for hundreds of years. Conjurations, peace guilds, and communes had been identified and condemned by religious and secular authorities since the ninth century. The fact that canon lawyers failed to recognize spontaneous
associations as legal entities was precisely what Gierke objected to.
While denying the possibility of such associations, Berman nevertheless insists that canon law permitted them. Yet the source he
cites, Gillet, discusses Roman law rather than canon law.2 59 More254. Id.
255. Id. at 219.
256. Id. at 220.
257. On the page of Foundationsof the CondliarTheory cited by Berman, Tierney indicates only that Gierke's views have been criticized. A few pages later, Tierney explains that
in La PersonnalitiJuridique,Gillet set out to prove that members of ecclesiastical corporations had some voice in governing the corporation. Gierke, by contrast, sought to prove
only that ecclesiastical corporations existed independent of their members, by which he
meant that representatives of the corporation could sometimes act for the corporation without the members' consent. Id. at 607 n.45.
258. B. TIERNEY, FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONCIUAR THEORY 98-99 (1955).
259. H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 219, 606-07.
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over, there were certainly influential Roman lawyers of Pope Innocent's era (the mid-thirteenth century) who objected to
charterless associations.260 Berman offers no support for his claim
that ecclesiastical corporations were governed by the consent of
their members, and it is belied by his own sources. "On the central issue," writes Tierney, "the location ofjurisdiction in a corporation, the view of [Pope] Innocent [IV] was ... forceful and un26 1
compromising . . . favour[ing] a strict authoritarianism.1
Tierney acknowledges that under canon law, prelates were expected to consult their chapters on many matters, but notes that
Innocent successfully promoted the view that consultation did not
entail consent.262 A century earlier, Gratian took a similar position. "[A]uthority had to be seen as being within the community
for there to be a possibility of constitutional government,121 3 argues Stanley Chodorow. "According to Gratian's theory of papal
legislative and judicial power," he concludes, "the possibility of
constitutional control was very slight indeed." 26 '
There can be little doubt that scholastic thought was deeply
authoritarian. The concepts that Berman treats as processes of social change-purgation, incarnation, corporation-were understood by the scholastics as enduring patterns of regulation and
control.
VII.

READING BERMAN'S RHETORIC: HISTORY AS HIERARCHY

Berman's thesis that scholasticism was a revolutionary force
consists of two questionable claims: (1) that scholasticism determined social change; and (2) that scholastic thought called for social change. We have seen that Berman's second claim-that scholasticism called for social change-relied upon a distinctive
pattern of interpretation. Berman consistently interpreted manifestations of hierarchy in medieval society as expressions of a
yearning for progress. His identification of progress with hierarchy can be explained in terms of an affinity for hierarchy expressed in his rhetoric. This affinity may also explain Berman's
260.
261.

M. TIGAR & M. LEVY, supra note 116, at 132.
B. TiERNEY, supra note 258, at 106-07.

262. Id. at 108-09.
263. S.CHODOROW, supra note 212, at 147.
264. Id. See also id. at 206-10 (Gratian rejects doctrine that what effects all requires
consent by all).
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tendency to overemphasize the historical impact of the ideas of
elites.
Berman's narrative is structured by a series of hierarchical oppositions between progressive and regressive forces. Berman begins with a distinction between western and nonwestern in which
1 5
The nonwesthe "western" is also identified as the "modern. 26
tern, however, is not simply the complement to the more modern
western, it is a perennial threat to it. "Constantly attacking the
periphery of Europe, and always ready to swoop into the central
parts, were the Norsemen, the Saracens, the Magyars. ' 2 6 These
attacks were an obstacle to progress: "A crucial aspect of the
enormous growth in prosperity that occurred during the late elevcessation of military
enth and early twelfth centuries was the final
28 7
south.
and
east,
north,
the
attacks from
Yet, it was not simply the fact of invasion that threatened
western progress, but the character of the invaders-the more
eastern they were, the less civilized:
The Hungarian kings had close connections with other European rulers and
attempted to imitate them, but their successes always proved to be tempo-

rary ... the fact that the population was predominantly Magyar, not Germanic... made a difference. Then in the middle of the thirteenth century
the Mongol invasion wiped out whatever progress had been made .... I"

Even today, things western are threatened by the inscrutable
east. "Since the end of World War II, 'East' and 'West' have often
been used to distinguish Communist from non-Communist countries," Berman reminds us. 2 6 9 What have been the effects of communist "influence" in the west? "[I]t was proposed . . . that law
and lawyers should be eliminated, or at least greatly restricted in
importance, as unnecessary and harmful to society. ' 270 However,
"[t]he breakdown of the Western legal tradition springs only in
part from the socialist revolutions that were inaugurated in Russia. 1 1 The real danger is nationalism: "[W]e still suffer from the
nationalist historiography ... that supported the disintegration of
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 3-4.
Id. at 301. See also id., at 101.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 2.

270. Id. at 37.
271. Id. at 39.
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Berman identifies such na-

tionalism with the nonwestern:
In the past, Western Man has confidently carried his law with him throughout the world. The world today, however, is suspicious-more suspicious
than ever before-of Western 'legalism.' Eastern and Southern Man offer
other alternatives. The West itself has come to doubt the universal validity
of its traditional vision of law, especially its validity for non-Western cultures. Law that used to seem 'natural' [now] seems only 'Western. 7 "

To be western is to be not only modern but universal; to surrender the claim to universality is to cease to be western.
Built upon the distinction between western and nonwestern is
a second value-laden distinction-that between the Germanic and
the Roman Catholic. Western civilization is the successor to
Greece and Rome; 27 4 yet, it is also modern, dating from the elev-

enth century. 27 5 Earlier law and society in Europe were "Ger'
manic" and "Prewestern."27
Indeed, "Germanic and other European folklaw had much in common with certain Eastern legal
philosophies."2 7 In all of these legal cultures, "the traditional,
collective, and intuitive sides of life were emphasized, and the intellectual, analytical, and legal sides were fused with and subordinated to them.

2 78s

To emphasize the collectivity over the individ-

ual is to be intuitive, even "sub-conscious. 272 The resulting law is
"vague, confused, and impractical, technically clumsy." 2 0 We
have seen that Berman minimizes the influence of Germanic folk
law on "modern" civilization. The reason is simple: Germanic folklaw was "primitive. ' 28 1 "[A] belief in the sacredness, or potential
sacredness, of all things, such as existed among the Germanic peoples and also in Eastern Christianity, inhibits objective, skeptical,
open, rational investigation.

'282

Vague and confused law was ap-

propriate for "Germanic man" with "his magic and super272. Id. at 17.

273. Id. at 33-34.
274. Id. at 2.
275. Id. at 4.

276. Id. at 3.
277. Id. at 78.

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 158.
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'28 3

This 'naive and inexact' manner of expression was well suited to the needs
of peoples who had not yet acquired a scientific outlook with its subjectobject dualism. For the peoples of Europe in the Germanic era, life was
much less compartmentalized than it later became, much more a matter of
total involvement; hence poetic and symbolic speech, which is closely associated with the whole being and with the unconscious, was more appropriate
2
than prosaic and literal language. M

For a people bent on progress, however, the Christian world
view was more appropriate. Western Christianity revealed that
"all the

.

. .

phenomena of nature were created by God to serve

man and were not haunted (as the Germanic peoples believed) by
hostile supernatural deities, and that therefore it was possible for
the wandering, warring tribes to settle on the land without
fear." 2 5 In the church's new legal system, progress was further
realized. Canon law procedure was more regular than Germanic
procedure ("systematized" rather than "plastic") but also more
flexible ("rational" rather than "formalistic"). If these claims
seem contradictory, Berman attempts to reconcile them by a scholastic maneuver: the regularity and flexibility of canon law procedure were "more modern," those of Germanic law were "more
primitive." 288
What made canon law more modern than Germanic law was
not simply the fact that its language was more prosaic; an additional advantage of that language was its privileged accessibility.
Canon law "was soon being studied and discussed by educated En283. Id. at 75-76.
284. Id. at 59.
285. Id. at 62.
286. Id. at 251. In characterizing Germanic procedure as more primitive than Canon
procedure, Berman may mean that it lacked the efficiency of the Inquisitions's fact-finding
methods:
Unfortunately for theories of progress torture derived less from the 'primitive
barbarism' of the so-called dark ages than from the refined law of the later
Roman Empire ....It appears in the Digest of Justinian, whence it passed into
medieval practice at the time of the revival of Roman law. Teutonic law generally did not permit torture, although some Teutonic codes, influenced by Roman law did allow it on a very limited basis. In the early middle ages its use was
very limited and almost always illegal, but with the rediscovery of the Digest in
the late eleventh century, it was revived .... In the course of the Thirteenth
century, it obtained general ecclesiastical approval [partly because canon law]..
. was influenced by the Digest.
J. Russsu., supra note 122, at 152-53.
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glishmen, who must have been impressed by its intellectual superiority over the almost entirely unwritten secular law."128 7 Corre-

sponding to Berman's preference for the western over the eastern
and the Christian over the Germanic, is his valorization of the
written over the oral. One form that this takes is a preference for
legislation over custom. "[U]pon his conversion to Christianity,"
Berman tells us, "a Germanic tribal leader would often promulgate a set of laws consisting largely of the customs of his people." ' 8 Berman celebrates a growth in the "objectivity" of secular
law as a result of the spreading influence of canon law.28 " By this
he means that "[t]here was a movement away from mere custom
in the sense of usage . . .to a more carefully defined customary
law .... The specificity of the norms ... increased as they were
increasingly reduced to writing. 2 9 0 Berman persistently identifies

progress with accretions of writing: canon law's "principle of conscious development, of growth, of reform, was manifested concretely in the stream of legislation which proceeded from the papacy . .

.

. It was manifested also in the continuity of legal

scholarship, as canons, glosses, decretals
and other sources were
29 1
collected and treatises were written."

Perhaps the source of this faith in the progressive influence of
writing is a sense that history itself cannot take place without being recorded. "Prior to the eleventh century," Berman assures us,
"one cannot speak of the Italian cities ... in terms of their own
organic development. 2 9 2 By way of illustration he recounts a se-

ries of invasions of Northern Italy, from the third to the tenth
centuries, concluding that "[a]ll this is important as chronicle, and
also as the history of the Lombards and of the Frankish Empire,
but it hardly forms the basis of a serious history of the city of
Milan." 293 Part of this conclusion is a sense that history belongs to
the victors (Lombard and Frankish invaders). Berman dismisses
"peasant revolts.., loosely organized, spontaneous... anarchistic or communistic," as historically unimportant by comparison to
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 256.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 273-75, 303-04, 321-22, 341.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 386-87.
Id.
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"the great revolutions-the great successful revolutions-of Western history . . . well organized and politically sophisticated ...

on

appeared."2 9

whose fringes they
But, part of this belief is a sense
that history is written by the victors. To be "well organized and
politically sophisticated" means to accept the necessity of obtaining formal recognition from ruling authorities. Because
Berman associates legitimacy with literacy, he tends to assume that
historical events are made by writing. Thus, the beginning of urban history is the issuing of a municipal charter.9 5
The emphasis Berman places on writing is implicit in his periodization of European history. If Berman notices a sharp break in
the eleventh century, it may be because the eleventh century witnessed a great increase in literacy. Georges Duby has shown that
there is little evidence that ninth and tenth century Europe were
significantly less prosperous, peaceful, orderly, or dynamic than
eleventh century Europe. In fact, ninth and tenth century Europe
produced little documentary evidence of any kind; that is why historians have irritably referred to these and earlier centuries as the
"dark ages. ' 298 Granted, such chronicles as do remain paint a
dark picture. But these chronicles, of necessity, were written by
clerics; and clerics-having accumulated most of the movable
wealth of society-were the principle targets of the frequent raids
that characterized the period. Because few laypersons were literate, any account of the feudal period that focuses on writing will
2
inevitably evaluate events from the perspective of the church.

17

It is, therefore, no surprise that the subsequent "revolution"
that Duby describes as "Feudal" is assumed by Berman to be "Papal." This "Papal revolution" was, above all, an act of writing:
There was no legal forum to which either the papacy or the imperial authority could take its case .... This... was the principal revolutionary element
in the situation. In 1075 Pope Gregory VII responded to it by 'looking
within his own breast' and writing a document-the Dictatus Papae (Dictates
of the Pope)-consisting of 27 terse propositions, apparently addressed to
no one but himself ....

This document was revolutionary. 298

294. Id. at 26.
295. See id. at 361-62. See also id. at 368, 371, 375, 381, 382 (description of chartering
of various European cities).
296. G. Duay, supra note 59, at 120.
297. Id. at 114-15.
298. H. BERlMAN, supra note 1, at 95-96.
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Even "primitive," nonwestern revolutions apparently cannot take
place without the stroke of a pen: "[Marx's] famous statement,
'Revolutions are the locomotives of history,' which was true of the
West, was not true of non-Western cultures when he made it;
partly because he did make it, it has since become true of some
non-Western cultures." 99 Berman's model of revolution-the locomotive of Western history-is dictatorial legislation.
Perhaps because of his commitment to the determinative
power of writing, Berman assigns a greater role in his narrative to
individuals than to social movements. In a chapter devoted to the
rivalry between Henry II and Thomas a Becket, Berman tells us
that "[t]he two men represented not just themselves, but two
great competing forces in Western history, the ecclesiastical and
the secular."300 Later, he informs us that "Henry II created the
' 1 One chapter is largely
English Common Law by legislation."30
devoted to "John of Salisbury, Founder of Western Political Science."302 Despite Berman's emphasis on the democratic character
of cities, he concludes that "[t]he rulers of Europe, especially the
ruling authorities in the various leading commercial cities, helped
to develop the system of mercantile law by codifying the commer8
cial customs. '"30
In this narrative, powerful individuals are not simply instruments of historical forces; often they make history their instrument. "In attempting to discover the causes of legal development," Berman reports, "one is aware that individual personalities
may play a significant role."' 04 Berman obliges by offering sections entitled "The Personality of Roger I,'' °0 "The Personality
of Henry II,"306 "The Personality of Philip Augustus," 30 7 and
"The Personality and Vision of Frederick Barbarossa."308 "Was
there something in Roger's personality," Berman muses, "that
299.
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drew him to law?"3 09 Yes, concludes the critic of nationalist historiography, "Roger's achievement, which was embodied in the Assizes of Ariano (1140), was closely related to his personality and
character, and especially to the combination of his Norman, Byzantine, and possibly Arab qualities."310 "Like his fellow Norman,
King Roger of Sicily," Berman continues, "Henry Plantagenet
had great personal qualities ... especially adapted to the development of a strong system of royal law." 311 Philip Augustus of
France "resembled other great lawmakers of his time ... in personal traits: according to contemporaries he had great physical
strength, was a lover of good cheer, wine, and women, and was an
indefatigable hunter and swordsman."3 12 Frederick Barbarossa
was "a man of great personal power, striking in appearance, with
a fine physique and red beard ...
"
Not a sissy among these
fathers of "The Western Legal Tradition": "To be a successful
ruler in the Twelfth century required a strong physical constitution."3 14 Even Pope Gregory, upon retiring to his chamber to
make his revolution, "was ready to exercise the enormous will and
pride and personal authority for which he was notorious."31 5
The formation of the "Western Legal Tradition" seems to be
largely attributable to remarkable personalities. "Canon law and
royal law, especially, had strong charismatic elements, looking to
the pope or the king as the divinely appointed oracle of the law..
• ."'I" Berman criticizes Weber's concept of "charismatic authority,"' 17 but only because Weber identifies such authority as "a specifically revolutionary force,"3 18 rather than a characteristic element of Western legal systems. By contrast, Berman praises
"Weber's concept of routinization of charisma," for "introducing
a dynamic element into what is otherwise an essentially static
model." 1 " This is especially interesting in light of the fact that
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Weber viewed the routinization of charisma as a stabilizing force,
in contrast to the revolutionary energy expressed in charismatic
authority. For Berman, however, progress is identified with
law-accordingly, progress is the product of remarkable personalities once they have achieved authority.
The historical importance Berman accords the personalities
of powerful individuals exemplifies a figure informing many of
Berman's explanations and value judgments. Law and Revolution
abounds in images of transcendence and hierarchy. The rational
or the ideal is first distinguished from, then elevated above, and
finally placed in control of, the natural or worldly. Progress is
identified with the determinative power of intellectual elites.
We have seen that Berman views law as intellectually superior
to custom and that their mingling debases law: where "the traditional, collective, and intuitive sides of life were emphasized ...
the intellectual, analytical and legal sides were fused with and subordinated to them."32 0 Fusion is identified with subordination.
The fact that Berman opposes the individual to the collective suggests that he is concerned that immersion in the group will lower
the status of an intellectual elite. This suspicion is confirmed by
his assumption that mingling of the religious and the secular represents the inevitable corruption 2 and "the subordination of the
clergy. 3 22 Berman's identification of community as a kind of subordination is significant in light of his tendency to describe progress in terms of vertical imagery. Consider his interpretation of
the Gothic cathedral: "Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of
the new sense of time, and of the future, was provided by the new
Gothic architecture. The great cathedrals expressed ... . a dy3 23
namic spirit of movement upward, a sense of achievement.
Such upward movement was held in check by the fusion of rational and natural, spiritual and temporal.
The sundering of these unions, conversely, permitted progress. The separation of spiritual and temporal represented the
liberation of the clergy, 24 and generated a "release of energy and
320.
321.
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324.
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creativity analogous to a process of nuclear fission." 2 5 One of the
products of that creative outburst was that great engine of progress, science. Because of "its subject-object dualism," ' 26 "it was
no accident that [science] emerged at the time when there was a
separation between ecclesiastical and secular polities."3 2 7 Dualism
made possible "the progress of science," which depended upon
"dialectical reasoning from contradictory positions, "' ' 2 "and the
intense effort to reconcile them by legal principles and concepts
on ascending levels of generalization. 3 29 Thus, scientific progress,
dependent upon fission, proceeded along a vertical trajectory.
The pinnacle to which such science aspired was not only
"truth," 330 but authority: "dialectical reasoning from contradictory positions would result in ...authoritative declarations of the
true faith." 3 1 The product of scientific progress, then, was
power-power appropriately described in vertical imagery:
The phrases 'old law' and 'new law,' which are usually attributed to the period just after Gratian, were actually implicit in his division of the legal
sources of canon law into two groups, the (old) conciliar canons and the
(new) papal decretals. Gratian's pupil Huguccio developed the doctrine that
'a decretal prevails over a canon,'... 'according to law.'""

In this passage, Berman characteristically sees a temporal distinction implicit in a vertical ordering; the vertical ordering here expresses not only a normative evaluation, but a recognition of
power.

Altitude implies not only value for Berman, but causal force
as well-the high has influence over the low. "Secular law," for
example, "had the task of lifting up and transforming the secular
relationships which it regulated," and did so. 33 3 Yet, even the relatively high can be influenced by the higher still. By comparison to
canon law, " '[s]ecular law emerged on the ground,' "" rather
than in the universities. "It was less programmatic. Partly for that
325. Id. at 88.
326. Id. at 59.
327. Id. at 158.
328.
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reason its growth was much less clearly marked.33 5 By the time
university-trained jurists began to 'summarize' [it], it was already
there."336 Nevertheless, "[s]ecular law was supposed to emulate
the canon law" and, according to Berman, it did. 37
Recapitulating Berman's rhetoric, then, it seems that cultures
in which reason and nature are fused restrain and oppress intellectual elites. The separation of reason from nature "frees" them to
"progress" toward "truth." This "ascent" to "intellectual superiority" confers "authority"-power over that which is lower.
This is the relationship which Berman suggests the church envisioned between humanity and the rest of nature. The separation
of spirit and nature implicit in a transcendent God and an immortal soul not only elevated "man" to moral and intellectual superiority over the rest of nature, it meant that "nature [was] created.
. . to serve man .

. . ."8

The church gave humanity authority

over nature merely by separating the two.
Canon law, by Berman's account, gave the clergy a similar relationship to humanity:
On the one hand, the new tendency to identify the church primarily with
the clergy, the 'hierarchy,' led to a sharp distinction between the clergy and
the laity. On the other hand, this distinction carried the implication that the
clergy were not only superior to, but responsible for, the laity. In other
words, the class consciousness of the clergy was at the same time a social
consciousness in the modern sense, a conscientiousness respect to the future
of society.

39

This passage is the crux of Berman's argument: the separation of the ecclesiastical and the secular gave an intellectual elite
authority over the rest of society, and properly so. This is the connection between Berman's peculiar social history of feudalism and
his peculiar intellectual history of scholasticism. Berman interprets
social change in medieval society as the product of scholasticism
because he is committed to the belief that ideas ought to rule history; he interprets scholasticism as progressive because it legitimized rule by an intellectual elite. "Western civilization" was, for
335. Perhaps Berman means that because secular law was less "programmatic" its
growth was not as clearly recorded as was the growth of canon law. The word "program"
is derived from the Latin word for "forward" and the Greek word for "writing."
336. H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 274.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 62.
339. Id. at 109.
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Berman, the time and place within which history was determined,
not only by ideas, but by an elite of professional ideologists.
Berman summarizes "the Western legal tradition" as follows:
In the West ...law is considered to have a character of its own, a certain
relative autonomy [from "religion, politics, morality and custom"]. Connected with the sharpness of this distinction is the fact that the administration of legal institutions, in the Western legal tradition, is entrusted to a
special corps of people ....The legal professionals ... are specially trained
in a discrete body of higher learning identified as legal learning, with its own
professional literature and its own professional schools or other places of
training. The body of legal learning in which the legal specialists are trained
[is] ...a legal science, a meta-law, by which [law] can be both analyzed and
evaluated ....[Accordingly] [t]he growth of law is thought to have an internal logic ... an inner necessity ... [t]he historicity of law is linked with the
concept of its supremacy over the political authorities.'"0

The determination of history by ideas is represented, for Berman,
by the political authority of law; yet, he sees that authority as dependent upon the autonomy of law from politics, an autonomy
which in turn rests upon the intellectual isolation of the law
school. Law is a form of politics, but must remain autonomous
from politics; legal scholarship is crucial to western culture, but
must remain isolated from it. How does Berman resolve this apparent contradiction? He resorts to a scholastic maneuver: The relationship of law to politics is that of the spiritual to the temporal,
of essence to existence. In Law and Revolution, Berman defends
the insulation of legal scholarship and education from all other
cultural and political influences, by identifying the law school as
the incarnation of all of western civilization.
VIII.

SCHOLASTICISM, HISTORICISM, AND PROGRESS: A CONCLUDING
INQUISITION

"This ascent will be betrayed to Gravity. But the Rocket engine, the
deep cry of combustion that jars the soul, promises escape. The victim, in
bondage to falling, rises on a promise, a prophecy, of Escape. ....
"'
This Essay has been about one book, two times, and two
ideas. The book is Law and Revolution, in which Harold Berman
attempts to characterize the relationship between medieval and
340. Id. at 8-9.
341.

T. PYNCHON, supra note 5, at 758.
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modern legal thought. The relationship he sees between the
thought of these two times is fundamentally one of identity. This
Essay, too, is about the relationship between medieval and modern
legal thought. It reflects an attempt to shed some light on this
question by explaining why one of our most eminent legal scholars identifies medieval legal thought with our own. The explanation offered turns on the relationship between two ideas: hierarchical authority and social change. Medieval legal scholars,
viewing the two as incompatible, rejected social change in favor of
hierarchical authority. Berman, viewing the two as compatible,
feels no need to reject social change in order to preserve hierarchical authority. What permits Berman to identify with medieval
legal scholars is a shared enthusiasm for hierarchical authority.
What distinguishes Berman's thought-and modern legal thought
generally-from medieval legal thought, is the faith that hierarchical authority and social change are compatible. This faith is
otherwise known as the idea of progress.
In this Section I will describe and criticize the idea of progress that I believe animates much modern legal scholarship, particularly in Harold Berman's field of comparative law. My criticism is at once intellectual and political. My intellectual objection
to the idea of progress is that it deemphasizes the conflict entailed
by social change. My political objection is that, as a result of this
deemphasis, it disguises the costs of social changes that do occur
and obscures the need for social changes that do not. While the
idea of progress may be no more appealing than the more static
conception of hierarchical authority preferred by the scholastics,
the two are distinct. Because Berman's tendency to confuse the
two is not unique, it is worth exploring the sources of his confusion. Accordingly, the final paragraphs of this Essay will address
that task.
The idea of progress that we have inherited from the nineteenth century reflects our culture's effort to synthesize two quite
incompatible value frameworks. One of those frameworks-developed by classical thinkers, reinterpreted and rigidifled by medieval Christianity, and carried forward into the modern age by the secular natural law tradition-we may call essentialism. Its basic value postulate is that only that which is universal
and eternal is real, true, and good. This postulate is so basic to
our experience of valuing that it is difficult to talk coherently
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about values if we abandon it. Unless it can be a criterion of comparison-a tool for "treating like cases alike"-we are reluctant
to call a passion a value. Nevertheless, essentialism has always
been undermined by the experience of valuing the ephemeral and
the particular, and it has increasingly been challenged
intellectually.
One particularly ominous challenge to essentialism that arose
during the nineteenth century was evolutionism. While evolutionism originated in the realm of social theory, 42 it developed scientific authority in the field of biology. The "Theory of Evolution"
mocked the fundamental values of essentialism-eternity, stability, and universality-by showing that survival over time required
adaptation and specialization. Evolutionism accorded with much
nineteenth century social theory-and much eleventh century social theory, particularly that of the monks-in identifying isolation with purity.3 43 J. Burrow has shown that enthusiasts of progress, who anticipated the realization of universal values over
time, tended to feel ambivalently toward evolutionism.
One of the arenas of nineteenth century social thought in
which this tension appeared was the incipient discipline of comparative law. A major figure in the development of comparative
law scholarship in English was Henry Sumner Maine. Chiefly
remembered for his thesis that western legal systems had gradually replaced jural relations based on status with relations based on
contract, 3 4 Maine was an ardent enthusiast of progress. Believing
that different societies had much to learn from one another, he
saw the comparative study of legal systems as a contribution to
legal progress. Hence, where evolutionists of his era saw isolation
as a prerequisite to development, Maine warned against the "morbid growth of isolation. ' ' uS Where evolutionists equated development with divergence from a norm, Maine equated development
with convergence upon truth. Where evolutionists saw development as an unconscious, natural process, Maine saw development
342. See
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EVOLUTIONISM IN SOCIAL THEORY
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as a conscious process of civilization. Yet, Maine hardly saw civilization as universal or all inclusive. Like Berman, he confined his
comparative impulses to the western or "Aryan" tradition.4 8
Even within this tradition, civilization was differentially distributed. Maine was inclined to view non-European legal systems as
residues of a more primitive stage of development, petrified evidence of early Germanic customary law. 34 7 Two historical events
had initiated civilization, and their memory divided the civilized
world from the uncivilized. One of these was the codification of
the Roman Law, making possible conscious progress. 48 The other
was the incarnation.3 49 Even though Christianity and the Roman
Law were culturally specific, Maine saw them as exclusive avenues
to civilization. From this followed the familiar justification of the
British Empire as the white man's burden, and in fact, much of
Maine's civilizing research in comparative law was conducted as a
colonial official.850
It will be apparent to the reader that many of the themes of
Maine's thought are reflected in Law and Revolution. Berman's
conception of development reveals the same tension between particularity and universality that Maine's did. According to Berman,
a certain measure of isolation is a prerequisite to legal progress.
The western legal tradition has developed "organically," that is,
autonomously. In particular, it has developed in isolation from
politics and from the nonwestern cultures currently threatening it.
This organic development became possible as a result of the
supercession of Germanic customary law by written Roman law.
This path to progress, moreover, was prepared by Christianity's
triumph over paganism.
If Berman's image of civilization is as ethnocentric as Maine's,
it is also as cosmopolitan. Berman laments modern nationalism,
and sees nationalist historiography as a threat to the western legal
tradition.3 51 For Berman, as for Maine, the function of comparative law is not simply to contrast different legal systems, but to
discover values common to a group of "related" legal systems.
346.
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Each of the legal systems may then be evaluated, criticized, and

improved by reference to the values "common" to all. For such
progress to take place, the legal systems must be sufficiently different, so that some are subject to correction. Accordingly, some criterion other than similarity must be employed in order to determine which legal systems are "related." For comparative law to be
practiced in the service of "progress," some transnational, extralegal framework of values must be invoked. Thus, reference will be

made to Christianity or western civilization-"cultures" neither
historically specific nor universal.
The ambivalence between planetary and parochial perspectives manifested in Law and Revolution is typical of comparative
law scholarship, particularly in the field of law and development.3 52 Such ambivalence is inherent, however, in any form of
social inquiry inimated by the idea of progress. The idea of progress involves a basic conflict between historicism and natural law.
Historicism posits that human nature is historically determined.
To the extent that human nature is viewed as a source of value,
historicism treats value as historically relative, that is, different for
different people. This obviously implies that people living in different times are not bound by the same standards and obligations.
But historicism has a further implication. It implies that even people alive at the same time are bound by different values if they
have different histories.
Historicism has been bedeviled from its eighteenth century
inception, by the recognition that people living in different cultures have different historical experience.3 53 Recently, anthropologists have been struck by the fact that different cultures experi3 54
ence history-perhaps "the same" events-in different ways.
For this reason, historicism tends to push one in the direction of
cultural relativism-seeing human nature and human value as culturally determined. In other words, historicism implies that
human nature cannot be a source of objective value. This conclu352. See Galanter & Trubek, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on The Crisis
in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062; Trubek, Toward
a Social Theory of Law: An Essay On the Study of Law and Development 82 YALE L. J. 1 (1972).
353. See J. HERDER, OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF THE HISTORY OF MAN (T. Churchill
trans. 1800); Gardiner, Herder, Johann Gottlieb, 3 ENCYCL OF PHILOSOPHY 486, 488-89
(1967).
354. See M. SAHLINS, ISLANDS OF HISTORY (1985).
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sion directly challenges a modern form of essentialist thought
commonly called natural law. Partisans of natural law assume that
human nature has been fixed for all time and that it is the same
for all cultures.. Accordingly, they believe that human nature is a
source of objective value. From this perspective, normative variety
among cultures is an index of normative failure-of deviation
from human nature.
The tension between historicism and natural law causes
problems for the idea of progress. Progress seems to partake of
features of both ideas, notwithstanding their contradiction. It offends essentialists by assuming that history is a source of value.
This means not only that moral standards change over time, but
that moral standards improve or ascend with time. Thus, if earlier
people cannot be expected to behave like later people, later people can be expected to behave better than earlier people. The assumption that later people can be compared favorably to earlier
people seems to run against the grain of historicism, by implying
the existence of an objective standard of value by which all people
can be compared. The historicist will wonder if this objective standard of value is derived from a fixed human nature.
The progressive may answer that human nature is different at
different times, but improves because historical experience is cumulative. Therefore, later people are everything that earlier people are, but more. They have "more" historical experience and
thus "more value." Alternatively, the progressive will argue that
human nature remains the same but that knowledge of human nature increases with historical experience. People with more historical experience, later people, know more about human nature;
therefore, their values are better informed, or "better," for short.
Not that earlier people are "valueless" or "no good." They have
some knowledge of human nature-and their values reflect
this-just not very much.
There are thus historicist and natural law variants of the idea
of progress. Both variants, however, are faced with the same difficulty. The progressive natural lawyer-progressive lawyer for
short 5 5 -is committed to the idea that historical experience
355. I use this phrase because the alternative, "the progressive naturalist," would
sound too much like a believer in biological evolution, which acknowledges that the natures of species change.
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yields progressively more knowledge of human nature. As knowledge of human nature increases, ignorance of human nature decreases. Thus, as the histories of different cultures progress they
become similar. Later people are more alike than earlier people,
as well as better, and similarity is better than difference. The progressive variant of natural law denies that the historical experiences of different cultures are, ultimately, different. At the same
time, it condemns observed difference. It offers no criterion by
which to judge other cultures except human nature, of which everyone is ignorant. However, since each culture's values are based
on partial knowledge of human nature, progressive lawyering justifies each culture in condemning the other, even though from the
standpoint of natural law, none is better than any other. Natural
lawyers sacrifice their image of all humanity joined by a common
nature, when they worship at the altar of progress.
What of the progressive historicists? The progressive historicists believe that historical experience "improves" values. But
by what criterion? If the same criterion is employed for evaluating
each culture, then the historicists must assume, like the progressive lawyers, that all cultures develop similarly. The historicists
must give up their cultural relativism in defense of the idea of
progress. Perhaps they will respond that each culture "improves"
on its own terms. This would have to mean that earlier people
would applaud the doings of later people, or else the same criteria
are not being employed. The historicists, however, will view this
as unlikely because those doddering old early people lack the experience and the maturity to appreciate their children's refinements. Indeed, the historicists are committed to the idea that earlier and later people are not members of the same culture. The
historicists must give up their historical, as well as their cultural,
relativism in order to adhere to the idea of progress.
The idea of progress, in sum, blinds historicists to cultural diversity, and turns natural lawyers into nationalists. The great difficulty that the idea of progress poses for historicists lies in explaining how any change can be counted as an improvement.
Historicists have difficulty identifying a normative vantage point
from which change can be evaluated. Natural lawyers, however,
have no difficulty identifying such a vantage point-their headaches begin when they try to fit the data to their normative criteria. Thus, the great difficulty that the idea of progress poses for
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natural lawyers lies in explaining how all change can be worthy of
praise.
Both difficulties stem from the same basic problem-the idea
of progress combines incompatible ideas. On the one hand, progress means social change. The experience of social change shows
people that past social arrangements were contingent. Often the
difficulties encountered in changing society make people think
that the new social arrangements are contingent as well. Social
change involves disagreement, struggle, nerve, and risk. The desire for social change is subjective; it is not shared by everyone.
On the other hand, progress means the right outcome. It is objectively correct, necessary, and foreordained. Even though "progress" reveals the contingency of past social arrangements, it implies the necessity of current social arrangements. The idea of
progress depends on the contradictory assumptions that value is
determined by history and that history is determined by value.
The first assumption is the condition for the historicist's assent;
the second is the condition for the natural lawyer's.
Thus, the real problem with the idea of progress is that it
tries to make social change appear objectively good and necessary.
In so doing it effaces the political, "subjective" quality of social
change. "Progress" is normally conceived of as growth-it preserves everything that went before and adds to it.356 It is dependent on the illusion that "progressive" social change can be
achieved without sacrificing what is changed. It is a sort of Pareto
optimality standard for evaluating social change, excluding any social change that makes anyone worse off.3 57 Hence, the idea of
progress has two unfortunate effects, one blinding and one paralyzing. The blinding effect is at work whenever social change is
praised as "progressive." The implication is that no one could ob356. For an appealing expression of this conception of progress see R.

COLLINGWOOD,

supra note 183, at 321-34; for a less appealing expression of it see R. NIsBET, HISTORY OF
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 101-03 (1980).

357. Pareto optimality is a standard of economic efficiency favored by scholars in the
Law and Economics movement. According to these scholars, a group of rational utility
maximizers, participating in an unregulated market involving no transaction costs, will arrive at a stable distribution of resources when no party can be made better off without
some other party being made worse off. The allocation of resources under these conditions
is optimally efficient-although the optimal distribution of resources might be different if
the initial distribution were different. This conception of efficiency is attributed to the Italian social theorist Vilfredo Pareto. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 34-39 (1977);
Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 OXFORD ECON. PAPEUS 255 (1967).
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ject-at least not without being terribly selfish. The invocation of
progress blinds one to the fact that social change, indeed social
choice, is always the product of conflict, which necessarily entails
people getting hurt. The flip side of this blinding effect is its paralyzing effect. The paralyzing effect of the idea of progress can be
deployed whenever social change is proposed by the disadvantaged. Since reducing their disadvantage necessitates reducing
somebody's advantage, such social change fails to meet the Pareto
optimality criterion of the idea of progress. Characterizing social
change as resource redistribution places it outside the discourse of
legitimacy defined by the idea of progress. It is "backbiting";
"complaining" instead of "contributing." "Progress" evokes
images of a harmonious world-a great and lazy river. Only a fool
would resist it; those who would strike their own course are reminded, gently, by the river itself, which way the river flows.
One of the ways in which the idea of progress denies the conflict inherent in social change is by claiming to keep faith with the
past. Harold Berman's claim that the modern idea of progress is
an outgrowth of medieval scholasticism represents an example of
this stratagem. Thus, even though Berman's commitment to the
idea of progress is what distinguishes his thought from medieval
scholasticism, it is also what impels his embrace of the past.
Because Berman's choice of ancestry is a particularly awkward
one for an enthusiast of progress, it requires some explanation.
Part of this explanation must be the political one already suggested: scholasticism advocated and facilitated the increasing institutionalization of the church; Berman's identification with this
process suggests that he looks fondly upon institutional authority.
This explanation is supported by the fact that Berman is not
the only admirer of institutional authority to associate scholasticism with progress. A similar claim has been made by the
neo-conservative social theorist Robert Nisbet. Remarkably, he
bases his conclusions on some of the same texts-Lovejoy,
Kantorowicz-in which we found evidence that scholasticism concerned itself primarily with the preservation of vertical structures
of authority. 8 This is not surprising in light of Nisbet's identification of institutional authority with progress: "The major periods of efflorescence, growth, and diffusion of the idea of progress
358.

K NISBET, supra note 356, at 88-93.
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have been periods in which popular trust in reigning institutions
* . .

has been high." 59 Like Berman, Nisbet sees the close of the

second millenium as a time of catastrophic decline in the authority
of institutions,3 60 with apocalyptic overtones,3 61 especially for the
west: "The west is

. . . no longer either feared or respected,

much less regarded as a model, in the communist and most of the
third world countries

....

Most devastating, however, is the sig-

nal decline in America and Europe themselves of faith in the value
and promise of Western civilization.

36

2

Berman and Nisbet share

a sense that western intellectuals have betrayed the institutions
that have made their civilization great. Berman's association of
progress with scholasticism can be partially explained by his association of progress with hierarchical institutions. What requires
further explanation, however, is his especially close association of
progress with the particular institution of the medieval church.
This further aspect of Berman's association of scholasticism
with progress, his affinity for the medieval church, must be explained in terms of the influence of one of his early teachers, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. Rosenstock-Huessy, a religious visionary,
perceived the idea of progress in medieval scholasticism. Yet, an
examination of Rosenstock-Huessy's thought will reveal a conception of progress purged of any trace of historicism. RosenstockHuessy found scholasticism quite familiar and contemporary because he shared with the scholastics the allegorical sense of time in
which "all times are present." 631 To find a warrant for social
change in scholastic thought-whether of the twelfth century or
the twentieth-requires more "vision" than this reader possesses.
I must conclude that Berman's admirable effort to keep faith with
a teacher has distorted his image of the past. The sad result is that
he has been untrue, not only to his own historicism, but to the
historian's task.
Any modern conception of progress, even Berman's, contains
an irreducibly historicist element. To expect progress, even the
natural lawyer must believe that historical experience is a source
of knowledge about human nature. This the scholastics surely did
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

Id. at 332.
Id. at 332-33.
Id. at 3, 317-51.
Id. at 331.
See E. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 185 (quoting Dante).
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not believe. They thought that the principal source of knowledge
about human nature was authoritative scripture.
How can Berman equate the scholastic posture towards history with his own? How can Berman attribute a belief in progress
to the scholastics? The answer to these questions is that Berman's
conception of progress commits him not only to some historicist
premises, but to some essentialist ones as well. These essentialist
beliefs form the basis of his felt affinity with the scholastics.
Berman argues that the scholastics viewed scripture as history, but
his rhetoric reveals his own profound discomfort with historicism:
[C]ontemporary European cases were too close to home to be analyzed ob-

jectively in terms of political theory; they could only be analyzed objectively
in terms of legal theory, because there the terms of analysis were narrower

and were ultimately limited by textual authorities. Contemporary cases were
also too complicated; that is, too much was known about them, and hence

they were much more difficult to simplify. Examples from antiquity were, for
John of Salisbury and his contemporaries, rather like examples from other

cultures used by modern political theorists.$"

For the eminent comparative law scholar, the comparison is
hardly accidental. Berman imagines that John of Salisbury sought
the explanation for the emerging state in scripture for the same
reason that he himself seeks the essence of modern civilization in
medieval scholasticism. In each case, an ancient text gains authority because it is so remote from experience. The implication is
that involvement in history precludes knowledge; conversely, political claims about one's own society can appear objective if made
in reference to an ancient one. If, however, one believes that
human nature remains the same, claims about the remote past
continue to apply. The great power of the idea of progress in legitimating the present lies in its promise of channeling change,
rather than preventing it. Its adherents share with scholasticism
the faith that the future is contained in-and contained by-the
past.
In a sense, Berman is right: for the scholastics, scripture and
history were inseparable. This was not because scripture was an
account of a remote time, but because scripture was a description
of the structure of everyday experience. The scholastics did adhere to one half of the idea of progress-the assumption that his364.

H.

BERMAN,

supra note 1, at 285-86.
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tory was determined by values-even as they rejected the
other-that values were determined by history. For them, events
were structured by the narrative of the gospel. However, the gospel was not the narrative of history; history was not a linear movement from a human nature debased by sin to one redeemed by
grace. Rather, the gospel was the structure of all experience and
of all authoritative texts. All experience-and all scripture-revealed the dual relationship between humanity and God,
'
what Lovejoy has called, "the way up" and "the way down." 0
This understanding of events can only be equated with the idea of
progress if one means something very different by the term "progress" than it has come to mean. To reconcile the idea of progress with an allegorical, rather than an historical, sense of time
one would have to reorient progress as a vertical, rather than a
temporal, figure. Progress is used in this sense when one refers to
the "progress of the soul."
This is the conception of progress advanced by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, the undergraduate teacher who, by Berman's own
60
testimony, inspired Law and Revolution almost fifty years ago. Q
Rosenstock-Huessy, described in an introduction to one of his
books as a "visionary," wrote on history, religion, law, and language. A German of Jewish extraction, he fled the Nazis in 1933,
and in 1935, was appointed Professor of Social Philosophy at
Dartmouth.86 7 Berman attributes to Rosenstock-Huessy "[t]he
concept of the Papal Revolution ... as the first of the great revolutions of Western history." ' It is to Rosenstock-Huessy, also,
that we may attribute Berman's conclusion that the scholastics
pursued progress. Yet, for Rosenstock-Huessy, it was not the scholastics that invented the idea of progress. The inventor of progress was He that had no need of it:
The idea of progress was not invented in 1789 or 1492. Jesus promised that
his followers would do greater works than he had done (Jn. 14:12). The
Church fathers championed progress as the Christian view in opposition to
the pagan belief in cycles of fate, with the golden age lying in the past; they
proclaimed the resurrection of life and love after and through suffering,
365. A. LovEjoY, supra note 184, at 83-84.
366. H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 636.
367. See Stahmer, Introduction to E. RosEsrocK-HuEssv, THE
xix, xxxv (1966).
368. H. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 574-75.

CHRISTIAN FUTURE ix,
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whereby God himself made progress in the hearts of the faithful.'

For Rosenstock-Huessy, progress unifies, whereas "[p]aganism...
meant-and means-disunity, dividedness of mankind. ' 37 0 Because it is opposed by paganism, however, progress is not possible
for all of humanity:
If I wish to understand the progress from the feudal state to the modern

state, it is no use to look at the states of Ethiopia, Nepal, Paraguay, and
Liberia although they all call themselves modern. I must know from another

source that though they are given the privileges of modern states, they really
do not disclose this progress to me. They are mere applications of a princi-

ple established in the center of modern history ....

371

The "other source" is Christianity: for Rosenstock-Huessy,
progress is not only limited to'the western world, but contained by
Christianity. Hence, those in the west who identify progress with
the advance of science and technology are mistaken. Progress is
properly identified with the pilgrim's "progress of the soul . . .
"$372 This means that progress is equally available to any Christian
at any time-it is not dependent on the advance of society as a
whole. Yet, it also means that progress is constantly available to
society as a whole, at any time. Rosenstock-Huessy's commitment
to essentialism makes him the first to acknowledge that progress
presupposes the persistence of a single standard of value over
time:
While 'evolution' makes us lift ourselves by our own bootstraps, progress
makes us stay more and more in the palm of our maker, and makes fewer
and fewer fall less and less out of his hand. . .. The greatest height of our
destiny is already ours when we use the term progress, as we otherwise could
373
not measure the individual event by a standard.

That same essentialism implies that nothing really changes. Rosenstock-Huessy agrees with Dante that all events are present at
one time: "what has happened and everything that is going to
happen are all of a piece, and neither is complete without the
other."7 4
Given the simultaneous presence of all events, the progress of
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

E. RoSENSTOCK-HuESSy, supra note 367, at 75.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 71.
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the soul and the progress of humanity are indistinguishable. The
great events of Christian eschatology are all experienced by every
good Christian. Similarly, all events are simply manifestations of a
divine plan, foreordained and encoded in the human soul. Thus,
for Rosenstock-Huessy, there is a necessary and exact correspondence between the path of the Christian soul and the path of
human history. The path of the soul is defined by the sacraments:
The Papal Revolution is successful, in so far as it gives to everybody's life
some tinge of a spiritual mission as a pilgrim. The seven sacraments, from
baptism to extreme unction, were established in the twelfth century, creating a psychic biography, adding to every "body's" physical experience the
"soul's" psychic pilgrimage. 75

This pilgrimage was not horizontal but vertical. For Rosenstock-Huessy, as for Berman, progress is a movement upwards,
symbolized by the Gothic cathedral: "The Papal Revolution goes
against the laws of gravity. The vaults of a Gothic cathedral are an
inverted ship. '3 1 The Gothic cathedral, according to RosenstockHuessy, was a diagrammatic representation of the progress of the
soul.
The new 'theologians,'. . . declared the bible to be down below, in the crypt
of the Church, as its foundation; their new science, however, had to erect up
from the ground the eight stories of theological thinking. The walls of the
new cathedral of theology were to reflect the mysteries of the sacraments. In
this programme, Hugo de St. Victor in Paris pictured the future architecture of the Gothic cathedral.3 77

In thus diagramming the progress of the soul, Hugo of St. Victor
recapitulated the biblical eschatology. But, according to Rosenstock-Huessy, he did much more: he determined all subsequent
human history.
Hugo de St. Victor 'overroofed' the crypt of the Bible by his idea of the
eight Orders of the Sacraments of Divinity which correspond exactly to the
ideologies of Revolutions:
Hugo De St. Victor ............................. Revolutions
1.Creator .............................................2. Creation of Matter ..................................
1917
3. Freedom of Will and Fall of Man (Adam) ................... 1789
375. E. Rosa, sTocx-Huassy,
544-45 (1938).
376. Id. at 544.
377. Id. at 547.
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Natural Law (Noah) .................................... 1776
Old Testament (Israel) .................................. 1649
New Testament ....................................... 1517
Church .............................................. 1075
Last Judgment (Resurrection) ............................. 998378

The making of such a chart reflects a sense of time which is
allegorical rather than historical. Only someone who shared the
essentialism of the scholastics could look at history in quite this
way. Rosenstock-Huessy identifies the scholastic sense of time with
his own because they are, in fact, identical. That Berman equates
Rosenstock-Huessy's conception of progress with his own suggests
the extent to which any partisan of progress is drawn to the essentialist premises of scholasticism. This is a matter not only of style,
but of politics. Rosenstock-Huessy commends scholasticism for
trying "to unify and Christianize the people of its time because
they were slipping back into paganism. ''1 For reasons of his own,
Rosenstock-Huessy preferred to regard twentieth century practitioners of genocide as pagan, rather than Christian. 810 Nevertheless, the eleventh and twelfth century "pagans" RosenstockHuessy refers to were groups attempting to live, work, and worship in self-governing communities of their own definition.
Of course, to concern oneself with the customs and aspirations of ordinary people is to step outside the scholastic world
view. We have only come to appreciate the importance of medieval communities organized outside of the feudal and clerical hierarchies, by consulting the work of leading social historians, a practice that Rosenstock-Huessy condemns:
History is back to the chronicles since it became 'social' history: it narrates
mere sequences of events and customs; there are no true periods. Conscientiousness forbids to have ever a fully new story begin. And none is fulfilled.
378. Id. at 547-48.
379. Id. at 548.
380. "The future of Christianity and the future in Christianity are both denied by
millions today. That Nazis, Fascists, Communists and Japanese deny the Christian orientation of history is ominous ...
. RosENsrocK-HuEssY, supra note 369, at 73.
Whenever modern planning has seceded from Christianity, war and slavery
have seemed quite normal to the secular mind. So today, economic order without respect for the human soul will mean, and already means, class war, racism,
and the return of bloody sacrifices. The latter, prophesied by the neo-paganism
of D.H. Lawrence, has been carried out by Hitler and Stalin.
Id. at 160. A quite different lineage for antisemitic genocide is suggested in J. COHEN. THE
FRIARS AND THE JEWS: THE EVOLUTION OF MEDIEVAL ANTI-JUDAISM (1982).
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Historians who insist on being merely scientific do not ask and cannot ask
how faith makes an epoch .. . for this we learn exclusively from our own
faith in the future. 81

Rosenstock-Huessy correctly identifies eschatology of the sort
practiced by Berman as incompatible with conscientious social
history.
Still, there is much to be said for eschatology. Practiced in the
proper spirit, it is easy and fun. Let us regard Rosenstock-Huessy's
chart as a kind of puzzle, and try to fill in the blank. 8 2 The chart
consists of two numbered lists of events. The events on the left
side are the moments of Christian eschatology, beginning the instant before creation and ending with the last judgment. The corresponding numbers increase in this same order. The events on
the right side are "revolutions" in Western history, beginning
with the first celebration of All Soul's Day around a thousand
years after the birth of Christ, and ending with a predicted
revolution that occurs at some point later than the Russian revolution of 1917. These revolutions are indicated by the dates at
which they occurred. Accordingly, the numbers corresponding to
these revolutions increase in the order in which those events have
been occurring. The striking thing about the chart is that the
numbers on the left side and the numbers on the right side move
in opposite directions. As we move up the chart, we move forward
in temporal terms, but backward in eschatological terms. We
move backward from a last judgment in which the Creator determines the value and the fate of everything that has ever existed,
to a universe in which nothing but He exists. What human event
could bring about such a state of affairs? And when will it occur?
Quoting Norman 0. Brown, Berman reminds us that "[t]he Christian prayer is for the end of the world: that it may come quickly.
381. E.

ROSENsTocK-HuEssY,

supra note 369, at 87. Berman himself is of two minds

about social history, respectful when referring to "leading social and economic historians,"
Marc Bloch and Georges Duby by name, H. BERMAN, supra note 1,at 297, condescending
when referring to unnamed "Marxist historians." Id. at 295. He characterizes the entire
concept of "feudalism" as a marxist misnomer, id. at 540, 295, contending that the term
"feudal" should be limited to legal relations between lords and vassals, notwithstanding the
fact that Bloch-himself no Marxist-rejected this idiosyncratically British use of the term.
Id. at 295-96. See Postan, Introduction to M. BLOCH, supra note 14; Hilton, supra note 64, at
30. Berman identifies Anderson and Hilton as "more sophisticated Marxist historians," H.
BERMAN, supra note 1, at 543, 635, and cites them approvingly, id. at 317, 323, 325, 326,
although he also criticizes some of Anderson's conclusions. Id. at 325, 328, 544.
382. See supra text accompanying note 378.
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The aim is to bring this world to an end; the only question is how.
A mistake here might prove quite costly." 383 It may take a hard
rain indeed, to bring the intellectual tradition likened by Berman
to nuclear fission, at the knell of the millenium, to its appointed
end.

383.

H.

BERMAN,

supra note 1, at 27.

